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Introduction 
Politics in the Desert: Corporatism and Post-WW U American Democracy 
In his book length travelogue America, Jean Baudrillard writes of a land within a 
land, a social desert zone inside postmodem America populated by those who, despite 
the winning of enfranchisement and human rights, and the profound political 
advancements made by woman, minorities, homosexuals and even prisoners, still find 
themselves isolated, marginalized and politically disconnected-a condition 
Baudrillard cheekily refers to as ''excommunication" (113). It is not the poverty or 
the political exclusion that compels Baudrillard to call this to our attention-America 
has always yielded its poor and marginalized groups-rather what strikes a notably 
ominous chord with Baudrillard is that this "Fourth World desert zone" appears to be 
"transpolitical" ( 112). That is, America seems to have managed to allow a significant 
segment of its citizenry to completely disappear from the social and political 
landscape without any residual political implication, without any political meaning 
whatsoever. 
For America, the existence of this "Fourth World" inside its own walls does 
not imply political failure, or even greater political apathy, but rather it is, in fact, an 
indication of its own political success. In post-war America, politics has increasingly 
come to signify only that which has to do with prosperity, with the signs of 
prosperity, or with that which brings about prosperity-economics, technology, 
innovation, stability, efficiency, etc. Unfortunately for those inhabitants of the 




Everyday life in America, at least since 1945, has been defined by the pursuit 
of prosperity. The year 1945 marked the end ofWW II and the beginning of what 
Immanuel Wallerstein calls "the period[ ... ] [of] the United States as the hegemonic 
power of our world system" ( 176). The origin of this hegemony was mostly 
economic. The great industrial powers of Europe had been physically devastated, 
having suffered large-scale losses of both human life and infrastructure. In fact, the 
only major industrial region whose infrastructure and equipment of production 
remained intact was North America. Add to this the fact that the U.S. entered the war 
already very industrially advanced, and emerged from it having developed new and 
effective management techniques and a level of efficiency which gave it an enonnous 
competitive advantage, and it becomes obvious how the Second World War 
contributed mightily to economic growth and to a prosperity unprecedented in 
American history. 
This prosperity in turn brought the United States immense influence and 
political power on the world scene. However, such prosperity also brought with it its 
own set of difficulties. As Wallerstein writes: 
Prosperity is above all an opportunity, an opportunity to enjoy, an opportunity 
to create, an opportunity to share. But prosperity is also a burden. And the 
first burden that prosperity imposes is the pressure to maintain it. ( 178) 
Prosperity can be an opportunity for the strengthening of democracy and democratic 
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values, but the immense pressure to maintain it can be an equally great strain on a 
democracy's integrity. In the United States after WWII, the national goal, the 
dominant public precept, quickly became the perpetuation of prosperity. In 
importance the latter objective soon surpassed the quest for greater equality, the 
nurturing of democratic values, and even the Jeffersonian ideal of the pursuit of 
happiness, as the central objective of the American utopia. The citizens demanded it, 
the politicians made it the driving force behind much of their policy making (foreign 
and domestic), and the various interests of corporate capitalism seized the 
opportunity to increase their political power and establish their influence on all levels 
of public decision-making. Even as postwar prosperity began to wane and the gap 
between rich and poor grew larger, the primacy of prosperity, its position as the 
central concern of the Republic, remained largely unquestioned, especially in public 
discourse. In the post-WW II period, those basic values on which American 
democracy was founded-liberty, equality, and the opportunity for effective political 
participation by every citizen-rlay an increasingly diminished role as prosperity and 
production consistently inhabit the centre stage of American politics. It seems in the 
ever-developing wrestling match between democratic values and the economic 
interests of corporate capitalism over control of America's political agenda, 
democracy is losing significant ground. 
The pursuit of prosperity, however, does not in itself provide a satisfactory 
explanation for the erosion of democracy in America after WW II. America's 
preoccupation with prosperity merely provided the opportunity for those with 
technocratic agendas to fundamentally alter the nature of America's political culture 
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and to occupy more and more of its positions of political leadership. And while this 
situation has certainly been detrimental to the integrity of democracy in America, it is 
really a symptom of a much larger challenge to democratic values. A tendency 
considerably more insidious and more dangerous than an addiction to prosperity has 
been emerging in American politics since the end of the war. Little by little the 
democratic power of individual citizenship has been usurped by economic and social 
groups whose political agendas are motivated, not by any consideration of the public 
interest, but rather by private interests alone. This tendency, this specter which, as 
John Ralston Saul puts it, "has been for some time the only real threat to democracy" 
(Saul 1994 79) is corporatism. 
As with much distinctly political terminology, corporatism, as a term, lives a 
hotly disputed existence and one must clarify it before proceeding. Narrowly, 
corporatism can be defined as a political relationship that exists between special 
interest groups and the state, arrangements which seek to bypass the legitimate rights 
and institutions of citizen-based democracy to promote policies and agendas based on 
the needs and desires of a particular corporate or associational interest, rather than on 
any notion of the broader public good. Corporatism is a kind of interest 
intermediation, a manner of governing which substitutes "para-parliamentary, as well 
as para-bureaucratic forms of decision making" for formal democratic processes, and 
which does not seek to govern by democratic consensus but rather determines state 
policy based on "a consensus resulting from informal, highly inaccessible 
negotiations among poorly legitimized representatives of functional groups" (Offe 
167). In short, it is any political shift away from the primacy of the participation of 
the individual citizen in a democracy towards the primacy of associations or 
organizations and their power to influence state decisions without electoral approval, 
mandate or legitimacy. 
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However, this limited political definition does not do justice to the pervasive 
social and cultural implications of the corporatist negation of democracy in America. 
Corporatism is more than just a theory, or even practice, of state and bureaucratic 
organization; it is, in fact, a useful term for describing the organization of post-WW 
II American society itself. Corporatism has its own value system, its own language, 
and its own social hierarchies. It possesses an ideology and its own army; it even 
boasts its own history of saints and heroes. Corporatism is part political movement, 
part religion, part conspiracy, and part illusion. It shuns the appearance of 
organization, and yet affirms the absolute virtuousness of organization as one of its 
central principles. As a social and political movement, corporatism's methodology is 
sophisticated, slippery, and often bi-partisan, and yet it has become so accepted in 
everyday practice as to become a fundamental component of modem American 
mores-an odd accomplishment in America, one would think, for a movement based 
on the contention that democracy is inefficient, impractical, and ineffective. 
Just as remarkable, as political theorist Howard J. Wiarda points out, is that 
despite its growing influence "to date, the United States has never had a full-blown 
debate about corporatism" (Wiarda 150). Corporatism, as a term, is very rarely 
uttered in American political discourse, partly because what could be called 
''American corporatism" is so different in form and style from the corporatism 
practiced in Europe and other countries, and partly because, as Wiarda puts it, 
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.. America refuses to call it that and it is hard to debate something that has no name 
and officially doesn't exist" (149). It is easy to understand the discomfort associated 
with corporatism in American political culture considering the popular misconception 
that it is politically parallel to fascism. However, this discomfort does not alter the 
fact that the roots of contemporary American corporatism, or what Wiarda terms 
"creeping corporatism" ( 129), penetrate deep into the political foundation of 
America. 
Philippe C. Schmitter, a leading scholar on the subject of corporatism, lays 
bare these roots, suggesting that corporatism, in one form or another, has been a 
presence in American politics from the very beginning of American representative 
democracy. He writes that "the genus of which neocorporatism is such a relatively 
recent species is associability-the propensity for groups of persons within a larger 
polity to join together in some more or less formalized way to pursue through 
collective action interests they believe they have in common" (Schmitter 1983, 904). 
Of course the right of association, and the right to organize, are fundamental aspects 
of any legitimate democracy. In fact some political theorists, such as Robert Dahl, 
would argue that the right to association may be considered a morally inalienable 
"primary political right," more rudimentary even than democracy itself. However, 
associability is no substitute for democracy; or, better perhaps, it is not necessarily 
the case that where there is associability it follows that there is democracy. The 
confusion between the two is the natural breeding ground of corporatist ideology. 
Alexis de Tocqueville, an early enthusiastic proponent of the importance of 
associability to American democracy, offers the following insight: .. If men are to 
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remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and 
improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased" ( 11 0). 
This eloquent appeal for a balance between the practical need for citizens to organize 
associations in order to make the procedures of government more accessible and 
responsive to minority groups' collective interests, and the more idealistic but 
absolutely essential impulse to vigorously pursue equality as a core democratic 
imperative, is part ofToqueville's larger project to protect liberty from the potential 
threat, that he perceives, an unhealthy fixation on equality might pose. Tocqueville 
firmly believes that a society devoted to equality, a quality he feels is both necessary 
for democracy and sure to grow as a political reality in America, would eventually 
show a natural tendency toward conformity, and thus endanger the development of 
liberty and individual freedom, qualities which Tocqueville insists must be protected 
if tyranny and despotism are to be successfully kept at a distance. Robert Dahl 
summarizes Toqueville's dilemma along these lines: 
In democratic countries the equality of condition that is necessary to 
democracy will, over the long run, tend to create a highly atomized society of 
isolated individuals and families, and to generate support among a substantial 
majority of people for a regime that undertakes to satisfy widespread popular 
desires for security, income, shelter, comfort, and the like, while at the same 
time drastically curtailing political rights and destroying the democratic 
process. (35-36) 
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What Tocqueville does not seem to anticipate is that democracy in America is just as 
susceptible to a "tyranny of the minority" as it is to a "tyranny of the majority;" that 
is, the democratic process can suffer as much damage through liberty becoming too 
dominant a preoccupation, to the exclusion of equality, as by the opposite scenario he 
so thoroughly explored. 
The art of association in America, especially since 1945, has developed at a 
pace much greater than the social realization of equality. The reason for this uneven 
development is largely economic. Robert Dahl explains that, while what mainly 
concerned Toqueville was the threat that equality posed for political liberty, the focus 
of many of those who influenced the framing of the American Constitution was the 
protection of economic liberty, that is the guarding against possibility that 
.. democracy, political equality, majority rule, and even political liberty itself would 
endanger the rights of property owners to preserve their property and use it as they 
chose" (2). Of course "the framers" were considering this potential conflict between 
equality and economic liberty in relation to a country that was still mostly agrarian, 
and not the advanced state of industrial capitalism of the second half of the twentieth 
century. Dahl writes: 
What no one could fully foresee[ ... ] was the way in which the agrarian 
society would be revolutionized by the development of the modem 
corporation as the main employer of most Americans. The older version of a 
citizen body of free fanners among whom an equality of resources seemed 
altogether possible, perhaps even inevitable, no longer fitted that reality of the 
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new economic order in which economic enterprises automatically generated 
inequalities among citizens; in wealth, income, social standing, education, 
knowledge, occupational prestige and authority, and many other resources. 
Had Tocqueville and his predecessors fully anticipated the shape of the 
economic order to come, they probably would have viewed the problem of 
equality and liberty in a different light. For if, in the older view, an equality 
among citizens might endanger liberty, in the new reality the liberty of 
corporate enterprises helped to create a body of citizens highly unequal in the 
resources they could bring to political life. (3) 
As "corporate capitalism" increasingly became the dominant economic order of the 
United States, American democratic values underwent a .. pragmatic" transformation. 
Equality and liberty became identified with prosperity and property rights; the 
American political consciousness began to synthesize old democratic ideas with 
justifications of the new economic order. The Toquevillian emphasis on the 
protection of political liberty from a system that is capable of an unbalanced pursuit 
of equality has, in its modem form, developed into a political system in which 
economic liberty seems to be privileged over all other liberties, while inequality is 
generally accepted as a necessary sacrifice to protect the sanctity of property rights. 
The ascension of corporate capitalism as a political force, however, indicates 
more than just a shift in the political values of America; it is suggestive of a larger 
phenomenon that fundamentally transformed the way in which both American society 
and its democratic institutions were organized. For Max Weber ''the spirit of 
capitalism is best understood as part of the development of rationalism as a whole" 
(Weber 76). That is, industrial capitalism was just one form of the larger 
"rationalization" of society. As Peter Dews explains, in Weber's formulation of his 
theory of "rationalization," 
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The structures of consciousness which made possible modem bureaucratic 
forms ot administration and the systemic profit-seeking of the capitalist 
enterprise are progressively set loose from the "Protestant ethic" which had 
nurtured them and given them their transcendent meaning. Regularity, 
asceticism, and relentlessly self-interested calculation are transformed into an 
''iron cage," a system of behavior to which individuals are now obliged to 
adapt in order to survive. (Dews l 50) 
For Weber part of that forced adaptation process involved a reformulation of the 
traditional liberal problem ofbalancing equality and liberty~emocracy, like 
everything else in a rationalized society, must fmd its specific functional place if it 
hopes to survive. 
Democracy in a modem rationalized society, Weber contended, was best 
considered as a mechanism for ensuring effective leadership. In a society devoted to 
the expansion of rational administration, bureaucracy, and organizational structures 
as a means of managing the increasingly complex problems raised by modem 
economics and mass politics, the individual citizen, Weber reasoned, can only hope 
to play a very limited role. The central issue for this "liberal in despair" was no 
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longer how to effect a civilized balance between equality and liberty, but rather bow 
best to ensure "an effective balance between political authority, skilled leadership, 
efficient administration and a degree of political accountability" (Held 1 59). Power, 
in this system, is primarily secured in the hands of the elite who can best provide 
expert leadership of those large political, economic, and social organizations that 
compete for influence over public policy. Democracy, for Weber, was merely a 
practical instrument for establishing the most competent leaders, for legitimizing 
their power, and perhaps for effectively dispensing with those leaders who prove 
incompetent. It is this notion of politics, as a kind pragmatic machine that functions 
in the service of the greater imperative of rationalized administration and efficient 
organization, that is predominant in corporatist ideology. 
Arguably the most influential school of political thought of the post WW II 
period in America, pluralism was developed as a response to this model of democracy 
offered by theorists like Weber and Joseph Schumpeter, who argued that democracy 
in America had developed into a political system in which power and influence were 
concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of competing political elites. 
Pluralists argued that this characterization of American democracy was incomplete, 
that Schumpeter, Weber, and the other theorists of .. competitive elitism" failed to 
take into account the counterbalancing effect that the presence of interest groups has 
on the distribution of power in a functioning democracy. The principal idea of 
pluralism is that democratic politics, when approached empirically, should be 
understood as a competition, between a large number of interest groups, for limited 
political resources-namely power and influence over public policy-making. This 
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component of competition in modem democracy prevents an unhealthy concentration 
of power, and ensures that the "political marketplace,. is never totally dominated by a 
single elite. For pluralists, "the existence of diverse competitive interests is the basis 
of democratic equilibrium and of the favorable development of public policy,. (Held 
187-188). 
In a pluralist model of democracy, the conception of democratic government 
as an "organized mechanism that makes possible that level of shared disinterest 
known as the public good" (Saul 1995 72) offers an outdated and functionally 
unfeasible understanding of democracy considering the complicated nature of modem 
America's social and economic organization. Pluralism challenges the very notion of 
a disinterested public good, emphasizing instead a model of democracy based on 
interest mediation and the decentering effect that the competition between factions 
has on the distribution of power in a democracy. To some pluralists this emphasis on 
the functional importance of interest politics, and the renunciation of public interest 
as idealistic and possibly threatening to individual liberty, is a natural extension of 
the American democratic tradition centered on the rights of individuals to .. life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness." Chantal Mouffe characterizes pluralism as: 
The recognition of individual freedom, that freedom which John Stuart Mill 
defends in his essay On Liberty as the only freedom worthy of the name, and 
which he defines as the possibility for every individual to pursue happiness as 
he sees fit, to set his own goals and attempt to achieve them in his own way. 
Pluralism is therefore linked to the abandonment of a substantive and unique 
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vision of the common good. (20) 
Mouffe is careful to point out that what pluralism is dispensing with is the notion that 
there is, in a democracy, a substantive and unique, that is singular, vision of the 
common good, not the notion that individual citizens within a democracy should 
consider the common good, as they perceive it, when determining what is in their best 
interests. Of course this is only partly the case, since it could be argued that in a 
liberal pluralist democracy the individual right to pursue self-interest is surely 
enshrined as a substantive good, a good that must be protected for the sake of all 
citizens. In reference to modem American liberal pluralism the same could be said 
about property rights-the absolute protection of which greatly limits the ability, 
though theoretically not the right, of every individual to acquire the primary goods 
necessary to pursue happiness as he/she might wish. Liberal pluralism does indeed 
have a notion of the common good-individual self-interest-and it is a good to 
which all other goods, in particular equality, are subordinated. 
Tocqueville himself recognized self-interest as an inherent and necessary 
element of democracy, but was also adamant that self-interest must be reconciled 
with a strong sense of public virtue if American democracy could ever hope to keep 
liberty and equality in a civilized balance. Tocqueville drew his concern for public 
virtue, but not his understanding of it, from the French social philosopher 
Montesquieu. Montesquieu's view of public virtue, as the sacrificing of the self for 
the sake of the public good, was greatly influenced by the classical republics of 
ancient Greece, but as Tocqueville rightly understood, it was an ideal that was pretty 
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much irrelevant to a thriving nineteenth century capitalist nation state such as 
America. Certainly public virtue was still a lofty political ethic, but the growing 
centrality of economic concerns and the pressing imperative to preserve liberty in the 
face of the growing revolution of equality, required that public virtue be approached 
pragmatically. 
As Arthur Schlesinger Jr. points out, the distinction between the classical 
republican ideal of public virtue, and the kind of civic-mindedness which places 
necessary limits on what could otherwise develop into an excess of self-interest, as 
commerce and the "acquisitive drive" increase their hold on the minds of American 
citizens, is a central component ofTocqueville's pragmatic understanding of the 
proper role that interest should play in the functioning of a democracy. Schlesinger 
writes: 
The great distinction, in short, between the classical republics and modem 
democracy lay in the insertion of the commercial motive. The city-state was 
founded on virtue, the nation-state on interest. The problem was to make 
private interest the moral equivalent of public virtue. This could be achieved 
through the disciplinary influence exerted by society on its members-an 
influence embodied in the mores and in law and institutions. Self-interest 
rightly understood: this Tocqueville saw as the key to the balance between 
virtue and interest in commercial democracies. ( 495) 
The result for a democracy, as Tocqueville warned, of a wrong understanding of self-
interest, is a rampant and excessive individualism-by which he meant a kind of 
withdrawal from civic life, a general civic apathy which isolates people from their 
fellow citizens. 
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Despite his recognition of the danger posed to democracy that the commercial 
compulsion, that is the propensity to think exclusively of one's own interests and lose 
all consideration for the public good, Toqueville, as Schlesinger tells us, was fairly 
optimistic about "the American capacity to transmute private interest into a facsimile 
of public virtue" ( 495). Toqueville could not have anticipated that the art of 
association or, as Schmitter terms it in its modem guise, "the science of 
organization," would progress at a much greater rate than the "revolution of 
equality"; nor could he have foreseen the relationship which would develop between 
capitalism, rationalization, and moral virtue in the American consciousness. Had he 
done so, it is certain he would have recognized that something stronger than a 
facsimile of public virtue was necessary to combat the diminishment of public life 
brought on by the development of specialized and professional interest associations. 
Tocqueville's optimism concerning America's ability to moralize private interest was 
well-founded-it is something America achieved with unprecedented brilliance. 
However, his contention that a moral and institutional simulation of public virtue 
based on self-interest would help to preserve the balance of equality and liberty was 
less prophetic. 
Following in the great tradition of French intellectuals commenting on the 
state of American democracy, Jean Baudrillard contends that modem American 
politics is best characterized, not by its efforts to achieve an acceptable balance 
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between equality and liberty, but rather by its absolute belief in the moral justness 
and pragmatic superiority of the American "way of life"-a way of life which is 
based largely on the concrete and the material. It is one ofBaudrillard's central 
observations that "in America only what is produced or manifested has meaning" 
(84). Ideas are not held to be inherently valuable; on the contrary, what defines 
America for Baudrillard is its absolute faith in its ability to transform "a way of 
thinking into a way of life" (84-85). In fact it could be argued that in modem 
American politics, legitimacy and materialism, like democracy and capitalism, have 
come to mean one and the same thing. This development is the result, as Baudrillard 
is fond of pointing out, of the profoundly moral basis of American society-it is an 
understanding of America that he acknowledges can be traced back to Toqueville: 
Tocqueville's central idea is that the spirit of America is to be found in its mode of 
life, in the revolution of mores, the moral revolution. This creates neither a new 
legality nor a new State, but it does create a practical legitimacy grounded in the way 
of life. Salvation no longer has to do with the divine or the State, but with the ideal 
form of practical organization (91 ). Baudrillard, though he never uses the term, has 
managed to zero in on two integral aspects of modem corporatism as it has developed 
in America-the idealization of practical organization and the practicalization of 
political legitimacy. 
Herbert Marcuse argues that this idealization of practical organization, 
combined with an obsession with production, has led inexorably, especially in 
America, to a kind of malaise of political "false consciousness," a condition in which 
the objective of all political decision-making seems to be an increase in production, 
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and political debate is limited to polemics concerning the efficiency and efficacy of 
competing methods to achieve this uncontested end. Marcuse attributes this state of 
affairs largely to the growing pervasiveness and power of"instrumental reason." 
Instrumental reason, for Marcuse, is the result of an illegitimate alliance of 
philosophical or theoretical reason and ideology-in this case the single-minded 
pursuit of profit and economic production. This has resulted in a "totally mobilized 
state," that is, as state fully integrated into the ideology of production at the expense 
of all other concerns, and consequently a "depoliticized" society. 
Marcuse's theory of"depoliticization"-that is "the eradication of political 
and moral questions from public life by an obsession with technique, productivity and 
efficiency" (Held 227)-is an extension of his examination of America's 
sanctification of"technical progress" and its obsession with rational organization. 
Marcuse writes: 
Political power asserts itself through its power over the machine progress and 
over the technical organization of the apparatus. The government of advanced 
and advancing industrial societies can maintain and secure itself only when it 
succeeds in mobilizing, organizing, and exploiting the technical, scientific, 
and mechanical productivity available to industrial civilization. And this 
productivity mobilizes society as a whole, above and beyond any particular 
individual or group interests. (3) 
Marcuse moves deftly between production and totalitarianism, weaving a theory of a 
state apparatus, machine-like in its function and organization, and monolithic in its 
drive towards productivity and in its ideology of"technological rationality." In the 
advanced industrial civilization, Marcuse argues, "domination is transfigured into 
administration" (32). 
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The problem with Marcuse's characterization, as David Held rightly points 
out, is that "while the state had become immensely complex, it was in general much 
less monolithic and much less capable of imposing clear direction than Marcuse had 
suggested" (Held 228). It turns out, and this is where Baudrillard picks up the torch 
from Marcuse, that in advanced capitalist democracies, especially the United States, 
the most immediate threat to democratic values lies not in domination or 
totalitarianism being transformed into administration, but rather in the diminution of 
the American democratic spirit that is the result of an absolute political legitimization 
of self-interest combined with a growing social, cultural, and political obsession with 
rational organization-the intertwining of the two central rhizomes of contemporary 
American corporatism. Furthermore, it is not that politicaVideological and moral 
questions are eradicated from public life, but rather that such questions concerning 
the public good become absorbed into the certainty of material reality; or, more to the 
point, they become mere simulations, disappearing along with the inhabitants of the 
Fourth World into the cinematic image of democracy and prosperity that is the 
American utopia. This is, of course, not to say that Marcuse's condemnation of 
America's obsession with techniques, productivity, and efficiency is not still of the 
utmost importance and relevance. The point is that this obsession has brought about 
a political condition more complicated, more subtle, and certainly more slippery than 
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Marcuse imagined. 
It is instructive to our purpose, however, to pay attention to Marcuse's views 
concerning the role of pluralism inside his "totally mobilized" and "depoliticized" 
state. What Marcuse perceived quite insightfully was that pluralism, while often 
offered as a countervalence to the centralization of power by the state, did very little 
to preserve the democratic integrity of the individual against the institutionalization 
of the capitalist drive for production. In One-Dimensional Man Marcuse writes: 
At the most advanced stage of capitalism, this society is a system of subdued 
pluralism, in which the competing institutions concur in solidifying the power 
of the whole over the individual[ ... ] Advanced industrial society is indeed a 
system of countervailing powers. But these forces cancel each other out in a 
higher unification-in the common interest to defend and extend the 
established position, to combat the historical alternatives, to contain 
qualitative change. The countervailing powers do not include those which 
counter the whole. (50-51) 
In short, for Marcuse, in the "totally mobilized" state, pluralism itself becomes 
institutionalized and thus is placed in the service of capitalist production. Indeed, 
again this may appear too simple an understanding of pluralism's relationship to the 
apparatus of the state to be wholly persuasive; however, the notion that the 
competition between interest associations, that is so central to pluralism's theory of 
countervalence of power, can be co-opted by a particular over-reaching ideology is 
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especially important to an understanding of the increasing influence of corporatism in 
American after 1945. 
As liberalism's response to Weber's and Schumpeter's characterization of 
modem democracy as ultimately controlled by rational bureaucracy and ruled by 
competing elites, pluralism is indicative of liberalism's "continuing inability to deal 
with the contradictions between democracy and rational administration" (Saul 234). 
The traditional liberal triad of moral standards (i.e., the right over the good), 
democracy, and reason, disintegrates into self-contradiction in the face of the 
corporatist transformation of '"the art of association' into 'a science of organization'" 
(Schmitter 908). Liberal pluralism is based on the fundamental idea that there exists 
a natural alliance between democratic methods and rational organization, that the 
large scale competition between interest groups for political influence is a central 
expression of democracy. However, as the organization of society becomes ever 
more rationalized, that is, dominated by the values of rational administration and 
systems, pluralism functions more as a means for solidifying the overall power of 
organizations over individuals than as an effective means towards a democratic 
disaggregation and distribution of power. The result is a brand of politics where the 
role of the individual citizen is increasingly diminished as power shifts into the hands 
of interest organizations, and of course those who manage, create, and control such 
organizations. It could be said that corporatism is a kind of hijacking of pluralism, an 
ideology that has managed to both appropriate and corrupt the politics of American 
liberalism resulting in a democratic system which increasingly functions in the 
service of administration, organization, and group interests, not strictly as means, but 
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as ends in themselves. 
Since the end ofWW II major American novelists-in particular, but not 
exclusively, Norman Mailer, Thomas Pynchon, and Don DeLillo-have, sometimes 
explicitly, sometimes not, displayed in their work an awareness of, and concern with, 
the threat that corporatism and its values pose to the quality of contemporary 
American democracy, and have often, in their novels, borne witness to the changes 
corporatism has already produced in all aspects of American life. While Mailer, 
Pynchon, and DeLillo often attend to kindred themes in their work, themes that are 
intimately linked to the increasingly influential corporatist presence in America, such 
as technology, bureaucracy, consumerism, and America's growing obsession with 
prosperity, efficiency, organization and expertise, each author's individual vision and 
unique perspective on postwar America offers a rich opportunity to focus on 
particular facets of the ideology and values of contemporary American corporatism, 
as well as to get a sense of its historical development as part of America's evolving 
post WW II political culture. One must keep in mind the importance of recognizing 
the complexity and variation of the American postwar era: each of the three novelists 
represents a particular sub-period of American postwar history: Mailer the WW II 
and immediate postwar period, Pynchon the "Cold War" period, and DeLillo the 
"post-Cold War" period. 
We encounter a vigorous and determined literary voice beginning a long and 
prolific career of political engagement in Mailer's The Naked and the Dead: it 
compels its reader to take account of a war against totalitarianism fought and won, 
while simultaneously, and perhaps more importantly, focusing attention on an 
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America engaged in a very different, though not unrelated, kind of struggle, a 
struggle fraught with ideological uncertainty, existential stagnation, and the many 
threats and challenges that corporatism poses for the American democratic spirit. In 
The Armies of the Night Mailer takes us to the front lines of that struggle, introducing 
us to the combatants and reminding us that what is at stake in the postwar political 
wrestling match may very well be the democratic soul of America. 
Thomas Pynchon, a novelist of a different generation than Norman Mailer, is 
a writer whose political perspective was primarily shaped by the paranoid and 
ideologically charged atmosphere of the Cold War, rather than the totalitarian horror 
ofWW II which so obviously influenced and politically motivated Mailer. We 
encounter in The Crying of Lot 49 and Vineland a sensitive and suspicious political 
voice whose tone is best described not as despairing or disenchanted, but rather as 
discontented. Pynchon is a writer with a keen and politically astute historical sense, 
who recognizes that much of the responsibility for the ascent of corporatism and the 
decline of democracy in contemporary America can be attributed to the winding 
down of the liberal spirit in the postwar period, and the liberal left's complicity in, 
and consistent failure to resist, the corporatist challenge to American liberal 
democracy. 
It is the insistent critique of the status of the individual in postmodem 
America which garners our attention in two of Don DeLillo's novels, White Noise 
and Undenvorld. By broadly examining the interplay in DeLillo's work among 
themes such as death, technology, community and consumerism, we confront a writer 
who is profoundly suspicious of the way that America's obsession with 
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administration and systems has degraded the role of the individual in determining the 
shape and character of life in America, particularly in the "post-cold war" period. 
The ramifications of a degraded role for the individual on the nature of democratic 
citizenship and participation are numerous and serious, and it is my intention to show 
that there is an inescapable, and often seemingly intuitive, sensitivity to the growing 
influence of corporatism reflected in the assemblage of themes that DeLillo attends to 
in his work. 
On a final point of clarification, it is not my intention, in this thesis, to label 
these writers as anti-corporatist, though I do not find such a label wholly indefensible. 
Rather I simply want to demonstrate that corporatism, as a term which ••better than 
any other[ ... ] describes the organization of modem society" (Saul 1994 74), is a 
useful political reference when approaching the constellation of political, social, and 
cultural themes that appear in the literature I will be discussing. 
Chapter 1 
"The shits are killing America": The Ascension of the Technocrat and the Decline of 
Existential Democracy in Norman Mailer's The Naked and the Dead and The Armies 
of the Night 
"As the years go by and I become a little more possible for 
Ph.D. mills, graduate students will begin to write about the slapping of 
my creative rage, of Mailer's vision of his rage as his shield, when 
what I was trying to say was simply, 'The shits are killing us.'" 
--Norman Mailer, Advertisements for Myself 
Let me begin with a general observation: taken as a political statement, Norman 
Mailer's work is uneven, imprecise, temperamental, self-indulgent, and, at times, 
guilty of such grievous overstatement and generalization as to produce an overall 
effect of serious awkwardness, or naivete, often prevalent in the ramblings of 
paranoids and egotists. It is also brilliant, penetrating, fearless, and full of the kind of 
vigorous political engagement which is so distasteful to contemporary corporatist 
culture. For our purposes, Mailer's central contribution is as a diagnostician, as a 
writer with a sensitive nose for the corporatist sickness in America, and a style 
combative enough to emphasize the danger he believes it poses to the greater health 
of the nation. 
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The political and social direction of America after WW II is certainly one of 
the central concerns of Mailer's work. Mailer seeks to understand his country 
existentially, which for him usually means in terms of power and self-creation. 
''Existential" is a term that Mailer employs often and widely in his essays and in 
interviews. Impossible to define exactly, the term implies, for Mailer, more of an 
attitude than a philosophy. This attitude is best described as the aura which surrounds 
a personality with the courage to confront the power of the will, which means, for 
Mailer, to recognize the freedom inherent in existence and exercise it through action, 
risk, and constant self-creation. That a nation can possess such an attitude and 
express a personality capable of exercising existential freedom in this manner is a 
belief that radiates in all of Mailer's musings on American politics. For Mailer, 
America is not based on anything absolute or unchangeable, but rather is in a constant 
state of becoming; liberty and democracy combine to form a kind of existential 
politics which, as far as Mailer is concerned, constitutes the closest thing to an 
essence that America possesses. 
This existential view of America compels Mailer to seek out the alienating 
elements in its social and political life. What, in America, destroys both the 
individual imagination and the sense of collective free will that are so central to its 
continued self-creation? Mailer's answer in work after work is the totalitarianism of 
technology and the values of the corporation. As he demonstrates early on in his 
career, in The Naked and the Dead, the old political battle between conservatism and 
liberalism, between the right and the left, for the soul of America is dead. In the 
wake of this, for Mailer, America has become ''corporation-land," and much of what 
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could be called political in his work is devoted to examining the violence that this has 
done to the democratic America consciousness. 
In his essay on totalitarianism found in The Presidential Papers, Mailer 
argues that "totalitarianism is better understood if it is regarded as a plague rather 
than examined as a style of ideology,. ( 175). The persuasion of totalitarianism that 
most concerns Mailer is specifically American; it is not the totalitarianism which 
comes attached to Fascism or Bolshevism with their penchant for absolute 
dictatorship and authoritarian oppression-modem American totalitarianism is not an 
employer of the hob-nailed boot or the internment camp. For Mailer the term 
totalitarian is most usefully affixed to a psychology rather than an ideology, or rather 
to a particular disease of the American mind, a contamination of the American 
collective consciousness by the growing ubiquity of the technological and of 
corporate techniques. 
In emphasizing totalitarianism's pathological rather than ideological nature, 
Mailer advances what is perhaps his most salient point on the matter-that, as it has 
manifested itself in America after WW II, totalitarianism has developed in a largely 
transpolitical manner. He writes: 
Totalitarianism bas slipped into America with no specific political face. 
There are liberals who are totalitarian, and conservatives, radicals, rightists, 
fanatics, hordes of the well-adjusted. Totalitarianism has come to America 
with no concentration camps and no need for them, no political parties and no 
desire for new parties, no, totalitarianism has slipped into the body cells and 
27 
psyche of each of us. ( 184) 
In America, for Mailer, totalitarianism transcends politics in as much as it functions 
as a kind of anti-politics, a "shapeless force" and ••obdurate emptiness" at the heart of 
American political culture whose pervasiveness spells, not so much the end of 
politics in America, as its stagnation, its descent into technological and corporate 
stasis. Though Mailer consistently employs the term ••totalitariann to describe this 
condition of American politics-a term perhaps chosen as much for its impact as its 
justness-as he develops and clarifies his political perspective on post-WW II 
America, the term ··corporatist" seems to acquire an increasing appropriateness. In 
fact in an interview with Christopher Hitchens, published in the New Left Review in 
1997, Mailer embraces the term, suggesting that corporatism's ideological presence 
in America is a matter central to his self-described political position as a ••(eft 
conservative." Asked to elaborate on just what he means by "left conservative," 
Mailer answers: 
You can define it by saying what you're against. You know, on the one hand, 
I'd say that I'm against corporations. I think corporations have done, as much 
damage to the world, or certainly will by the time they are finished, as the 
communists ever did to the intelligence of Russians. That, in fact, 
corporatism and Stalinism have many more similarities than differences. 
(Hitchens 117) 
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Mailer's point, that corporatism in America is a kind of kindred spirit to 
totalitarianism, is one that he first started making in print with the publication of his 
first novel, The Naked and the Dead, in 1948. 
In The Naked and the Dead, Mailer's novel about WW II, the diminishment 
and atrophy of politics in modem America are reflected in the impotence of the 
ideological conflict between the ·~fascist" General Cummings and the .. liberal" Lt. 
Hearn. Jean Radford argues that one ofthe chief ironies underlying this conflict is 
that Cummings and Hearn .. are both officers involved in fighting a war against 
fascism with a military instrument which is itself fascistic in organization, structure, 
and ideology" (44). It seems that on this one point-that the army is 
fascistic-Cummings and Hearn agree, though certainly with greatly differing 
degrees of approval. Radford explains that Mailer's portrayal of the army here is part 
of a larger challenge in the novel to .. expedient fascism," that is, to the notion that the 
totalitarian exercise of power within certain organizations, such as the military or 
large corporations, can be justified on the grounds that it maximizes efficiency and 
productivity. Radford especially notes Mailer's distaste for the political hypocrisy 
which this matter seems to expose in the American war effort, and which seems 
characteristic both of military men such as Cummings and progressive thinkers such 
as Hearn. 
On a certain level this may be the case. Mailer is assuredly not particularly 
enamoured of the strict hierarchical structure and undemocratic nature of the military. 
Also, undoubtedly, scenes such as the one in which Lt. Hearn protests the privilege 
accorded the officers of receiving an unfair and unequal portion of meat while the 
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enlisted men are left without, are meant to correspond ironically with the tales of 
racism, poverty, and social inequality in American civilian life, which Mailer unfolds 
by way of his .. Time Machine" literary device. However, one must not lose sight of 
the fact that the centre of this novel is historical, or perhaps more specifically, a well-
defined historical event-WW 11-and its significance as a point of rupture in the 
political, social, and cultural life of America. What Mailer provides in The Naked 
and the Dead is not so much a depiction of WW II as a perspective, a point of view 
that, while certainly critical of the army and its officers, understands the hypocrisy 
and fascist mentality of American institutions like the military as antiquated, as the 
last vestiges of an ideology that, by the time of the war in the Pacific, was 
anachronistic, and whose transfonnation into more sophisticated and subtle forms of 
totalitarianism was ultimately greatly facilitated by the war. 
For General Cummings the army constitutes a testing ground for his fascist 
social theories. When Cummings asserts that one could ''consider the army . . . as a 
preview of the future" (Mailer 283), the irony lies not in the potential for the victor to 
assume the fascist nature of the defeated, but rather in Cummings' failure to perceive 
that changes already afoot in both American society and the anny itself, as the war 
draws to a close, have already rendered his fascist ideals anachronistic and socially 
irrelevant. 
Cummings' fascism is of the heroic variety, full of glorifications of the will 
and grandiose theories of power. Ideologically it is rooted in a particular 
understanding of history and the purposes of conflict. In one distinctly metaphysical 
passage, Cummings associates his firm belief in the inevitability of fascism with a 
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larger historical process: 
I like to call it a process of historical energy. There are countries which have 
latent powers, latent resources, they are full of potential energy, so to speak. 
And there are great concepts which can unlock that, express it. As kinetic 
energy a country is organization, co-ordinated effort, your [Hearn's] epithet, 
fascism .. . Historically the purpose of this war is to translate America's 
potential into kinetic energy. (280) 
All of the metaphysical trappings aside, the essence of what the General says here has 
some validity in respect to America. Indeed organization, in its dual fonns of 
associability and bureaucracy, is a powerful element, both latent and present, in 
American democracy. Just as valid is Cummings' somewhat overstated thesis that 
WW II would bring organization and the structural consolidation of power to the 
forefront of the postwar American political and social scene. Where General 
Cummings' historical perspective fails, however, is in his idealistic claim that it is 
"great concepts" which hold the capacity to release the "potential energy" of large 
scale political and social organization; indeed, as the General himself will later learn, 
the organizational impulse in America is based on phenomena much more mundane 
and materialistic than he predicted. 
The grand concept which Cummings believes will allow for the release of 
America from what he calls "the backwaters of history" is the emergence of a new 
kind of political leader in America. According to Cummings' teleology, the postwar 
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period in America will be defined by a fortuitous convergence of America's final 
realization of its historical destiny, and the development confluence that will 
encourage those in leadership positions in America to express power without feelings 
of guilt or anxiety. As he explains to Hearn: 
For the past century the entire historical process has been working toward 
greater and greater consolidation of power. Physical power for this century, 
an extension of our universe, and a political power, a political organization to 
make it possible. Your men of power in America, I can tell you, are 
becoming conscious of their real aims for the first time in our history. (281) 
Cummings views the war as a significant transitional moment for America, 
the endgame of America's emergence from the dark ages of a country unsure of its 
destiny to a new renaissance of organization and power which will produce a country 
unashamed and unafraid to openly express and impose its will. History, according to 
Cummings, is firmly in the camp of fascism. 
By including Cummings' fascist theories as a central component of the novel, 
Mailer achieves something subtler than just a warning about a nascent American 
fascism, or a philosophical point about the underlying fascist tendencies of large 
organizations. There is an air of elegy surrounding Mailer's depiction of Cummings 
and his metaphysics. Certainly be is every bit the "monster'' that Hearn describes 
him as, but he is also engaging, charismatic, and willing to appeal to the imagination. 
There is, as Mailer might put it, something of the existentialist in Cummings-a 
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distrust of the purely rational and a certain flare for the dramatic and the tragic. At 
the heart of Cummings' personality, though not his ideology, is an enemy that Mailer 
can respect, a worthy adversary for those who believe that to struggle with the devil is 
an existential act. For Mailer he has the kind of politics which has the potential to 
reveal .. being," to force a man to explore his soul, and a country to discover its 
meaning. In many respects The Naked and the Dead is, at least in part, a lament for a 
vital style of politics that is now past, and a nostalgic acknowledgement, by a 
determined leftist, of a worthy, but now passe, enemy. 
Cummings is a wake-up call to the American left. In one discussion with 
Cummings, Hearn remarks that "We're moving toward greater organization, and I 
don't see how the left can win that battle in America" {280). Hearn, the single 
significant liberal presence in the novel, is resigned to the fact that post-WW II 
American politics will be dominated, not by ideological struggles between left and 
right, but by the struggle for control of growing and increasingly powerful 
bureaucratic systems and extra-governmental associations. The significance of 
Cummings in this corporatist vision of the future is finally his insignificance. 
Fascism, with all of its dramatic and metaphysical violence, will, in the new 
rationalized America, be relegated to the ideological graveyard of political science 
textbooks. General Cummings, and those like him, will no longer constitute the face 
of the authoritarian threat to American democracy-the enemy would be far less 
obvious than Cummings' "League of Omnipotent Men" (342). 
Equally as impotent in the face of the creeping spectre of the "new" 
totalitarian organization of America as Cummings' naked fascism is Hearn's dead 
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liberalism. Hearn's weak and half-hearted effort to respond to Cummings' fascist 
vision of a society based on "subservience to the machine" with his talk of"the 
continual occurrence and re-forming of certain ethical ideas" (154) and the "different 
tensions" experienced by ethnic minorities is indicative of Mailer's pessimism 
concerning liberalism's potential to provide meaningful resistance in America. Many 
critics have addressed the issue of Hearn's liberalism in the novel. Some, such as 
Robert Solotroff and Jennifer Bailey, read Hearn as ultimately a defeated liberal 
whose eventual death confirms that Mailer regards liberal ideology as ineffective and 
incapable of responding to a serious totalitarian threat. Others, perhaps most 
vigorously Nigel Leigh, interpret Hearn as a kind of martyred liberal, a figure of 
repression who struggles against his repressor, but is ultimately sacrificed in 
recognition of"the immediacy and potency of the potential domestic right-wing 
threat as perceived by Mailer" (Leigh 20). Lost in all of this, it would seem, is any 
serious consideration of the apparent superficial nature of Hearn's liberalism. 
Hearn begins to explore leftist political possibilities in college, briefly 
dallying with revolutionary Marxism-"there is even a political honeymoon for a 
month. He [Hearn] reads some Marx and Lenin, joins the John Reed Society" 
(Mailer 298). However, he soon abandons politics in favour of football and self-
involved boredom. In one of their political discussions he tells Cummings that 
"there're times when I think it's Ghandi who's right" (280), but later, forced to 
confront the reality oflife as part of Sergeant Croft's platoon, he entertains the 
possible advantages of violent resistance: 
If the world turned Fascist, if Cummings had his century, there was a little 
thing he could do. There was always terrorism. But a neat terrorism with 
nothing sloppy about it, no machine guns, no grenades, no bombs, nothing 
messy, no indiscriminate killing. Merely the knife and the garotte, a few 
trained men and a list of fifty bastards to be knocked off, and then another 
fifty. (508) 
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Almost immediately this train of thought is dismissed as "horseshit." Ultimately the 
sum total of Hearn's liberalism is a vague belief in the necessity of struggle--.. you 
had to keep resisting"-and in the importance of egalitarian gestures-''you had to do 
things like giving up a commission"-as well as a tentative optimism concerning the 
essential motives of leftist leaders and groups-" When things got really bad, maybe 
the political differences on the Left would be shelved" (508). 
Hearn indulges his liberal inclinations, less out of strongly held political 
beliefs or moral ideals, than as a result of his inability to adequately resolve his 
bourgeois guilt with his feelings of intellectual superiority and his acceptance of 
privilege. Hearn's leftism poses as concern for his fellow man, but even Hearn 
himself is acutely aware of the significant limitations of his sense of 
compassion-.. Several people had at one time or another made it a point to tell Hearn 
that he liked men only in the abstract and never in the particular, a cliche of course, 
an oversimplification, but not without casual truth" (63). Hearn's liberalism is indeed 
weak and ineffectual, suffering as it does from being both abstract and self-serving in 
nature. For Hearn, liberalism is more a convenient tool than a set of political 
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beliefs-a tool for rebellion against his father, a tool for separating himself from 
other less enlightened officers in the army, a tool for easing his guilt over his position 
and privilege, and a tool which allows him to obey authority while keeping his sense 
of intellectual and more superiority intact. Hearn's impotent liberalism in The Naked 
and the Dead is not the result of Mailer's having given up on the ideals of the 
political Left, nor is it the product of Mailer's interest in allegorizing its potential 
defeat; rather Hearn's liberalism suffers from the same sickness as Cummings' 
fascism-the same sickness, I would argue, that Mailer detects in modem American 
politics as a whole-a lack of existential authenticity. 
It is for these reasons that I cannot wholly agree with Paul Levine when, in a 
discussion of Mailer's politics, or what Levine calls Mailer's "civil war," he argues 
that "the opposition between a dying liberalism and a nascent fascism becomes the 
central dialectic in Mailer's work" (Levine 162). Certainly liberalism's unhealthy 
state and America's flirtations with fascism are important concerns of Mailer's, but 
they represent, not so much a central dialectic in his work, as signs of political decay, 
symptoms of a larger condition that Mailer, in a speech given during a debate with 
William Buckley, would later characterize as "a disease which afflicts almost all of 
us ... so prevalent, insidious and indefinable that I choose to call it a plague" (Mailer 
1964 165). This plague is perhaps best described as a mass betrayal of"being." a 
pervasive modality of existentially inauthentic consciousness which has infected 
America's political culture with apathy, alienation, and a desperate desire for nothing 
more than stability and security. 
For Mailer, American politics, afflicted as it is with this plague, has become 
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the enemy of history-anti-dialectical, stagnant with timidity, and a means towards 
the obliteration of distinction. A healthy and vibrant politics provides an arena for 
meaningful struggle, a sphere in which the particular dialectic that Mailer contends 
constitutes the most profoundly influential struggle of Western history-"the great 
and mortal debate between rebel and conservative" ( 165}---<:an continue to create, 
challenge, and debate America's understanding of itself and its future. 
Totalitarianism, Mailer's term for the politics of this plague, is, in effect, a denial of 
the historic validity and power of this dialectic; it attempts, in the name of stability 
and security, to conflate the rebel and the conservative, the two modes of existential 
democratic citizenship, into a single mode, a single ideology of organization and 
efficient administration. 
In The Naked and the Dead Mailer demonstrates, through the ideological 
impotence of the Cummings-Heam conflict, his belief that the struggle between the 
liberal and the fascist, the modem manifestation of the rebel versus conservative 
dialectic, will become increasingly irrelevant to postwar American politics. In its 
place a consolidation of power has developed, not as Cummings would have it, in the 
hands of the new proponents of his fascist power morality, or as Hearn might wish, in 
the hands of the historically repressed and their representatives on the Left, but rather 
power seems to Mailer to be increasingly consolidated in the hands of what he has 
called "the statistical congelations of the Centre" ( 173 )--referring of course to the 
rational structures and administrative organizations which increasingly inhabit the 
centre of American existence. If there is a central dialectic in Mailer's politics, it is 
not the struggle between a dying liberalism and a nascent fascism, but rather the 
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struggle between the existential individual and the plague-ridden organization. More 
important, in reference to The Naked and the Dead, is Mailer's recognition that the 
real threat to democracy and existential self-determination in postwar America will 
not come from fascism, but from America's increasing corporatization, and from the 
power wielded by that particular ideology's devoted disciple-the technocrat. In the 
novel Major Dalleson most definitively exemplifies this role. 
Major Dalleson, the red-faced, thin-lipped mediocre bureaucrat, whose "only 
desire was to be promoted to captain, permanent grade" (Mailer 571 ), manages, in the 
closing pages of the novel, to steal General Cummings' glorious climax. Through a 
combination of luck and benign opportunism, Dalleson finds himself in command of 
the successful invasion ofBotoi Bay, which "in the official history of the campaign 
sent to Anny ... was given as the main reason for breaking through the Toyaku Line" 
(571) and consequently the final occupation by the American army of the island of 
Anopepei. This final irony is employed by Mailer to blatantly imply that, as 
Cummings is finally compelled to accept, "it would be the hacks who would occupy 
history's seat after the war" (623). The future, Mailer seems to be suggesting, 
belongs to those like Dalleson, who appear to derive immense pleasure and 
satisfaction from their own instrumentality, who can accept as their greatest purpose 
their assigned role as part of a larger system which they neither control nor 
completely understand. The final image ofthe novel is ofDalleson sitting in his 
newly finished shack, going about his administrative duties and paper work, and 
contemplating new techniques for his map-reading course with what Mailer describes 
as "a simple childish joy" (626}-a parting glimpse perhaps of the new American 
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guardian of power, the technocratic priest of the postwar corporatist configuration of 
America going about his work. This is a more archetypal image than it might first 
appear, especially when one considers John Ralston Saul's assertion that "the first 
technocrat was not produced by ENA of Sciences Po or Harvard. He marched out of 
the military school and his profession was that of staff officer" (Saul 1992 179). 
In a collection of writings and interviews called Cannibals and Christians 
Mailer writes: 
There is one expanding horror in American life. It is that our long odyssey 
toward liberty, democracy and freedom-for-all may be achieved in such a way 
that utopia remains forever closed, and we live in freedom and hell, debased 
of style, not individual from one another, void of courage, our fear 
rationalized away. (Mailer 1966 51) 
In short, Mailer's nightmare is an America populated not by individual citizens, but 
by technocrats. Democracy, for Mailer, draws its energy and its existential validity 
from its revolutionary potential, its ability to pose a constant and present threat to 
those individuals and organizations who wield privilege and power in American life. 
At the heart of democracy is conflict, the struggle between opposing ideologies and 
ideas, willing to risk both the responsibilities of victory and the possibility of defeat, 
to play a role in defining what Mailer often refers to as "the American reality." 
Democracy is existential for precisely these reasons, because it involves risk, because 
its end is unknown, because it evokes in the individual citizen psychologies of both 
fear and courage, and because when it is pursued vigorously democracy has the 
potential of"discovering more of the American reality to us" (Mailer 1964 26). 
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Central to Mailer's unique brand of political etiology is his understanding that 
American politics, particularly after the war, bas become less and less a process for 
discovering, shaping, and defining the reality of America, and increasingly concerned 
with managing and organizing it. Due to its growing obsession with stability, 
organization, and productivity, America seems content to relinquish the keys to many 
of its most important political and social structures to technocrats. These anointed 
middlemen who seem determined to banish risk, conflict, and any trace of the 
revolutionary from the American political scene, are for Maih:r, the chief clerics of 
America's new political culture of rationalization-a political culture based on 
management and administration which values efficiency and organization above all 
else, and threatens to completely undermine the existential potency of American 
democracy. 
Mailer recognized, in the ascendancy of the technocrat, a fundamental shift, 
not just in American political culture, but in America's style, its psychology. The 
American democratic mind possessed imagination and vision, it drew its vitality from 
the conflict of ideas and possessed the ability to sustain itself purely on the promise 
of what is possible. The psychology characteristic of the technocrat, which Mailer 
identifies as totalitarian, is perhaps best described as a great yawning void, a psyche 
unseduced by new ideas and existentially ravaged by the ubiquity of corporate 
rationality and the security of the organization. In General Cummings' words, "the 
techniques had outraced the psyche" (Mailer l ?48 342), or perhaps more to the point, 
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for Mailer, the spirit, or lack thereof, of the technocrat bas hijacked the American 
psyche. In the Presidential Papers Mailer refers to it as a plague "that bas slipped 
into the body parts and psyche of each of us" (184); in Of a Fire on the Moon he calls 
it "the psychology of machines" ( 184 ); and in Armies of the Night "the walking 
American lobotomy" (I 02). What Mailer is approaching, as he comes to terms in 
these books with the growing influence and efficiency of the administrative and 
technological organization of America since the end of WW II, is the increasing 
impossibility of politics in America, and the dawn of a new age of technocracy and 
corporatism. 1 
The Armies of the Night, Mailer's noveVbistory dealing with the 1967 anti-
Vietnam war demonstration at the Pentagon, may be seen as Mailer's attempt to 
assess the true state of postwar American democracy, to mark the depth to which 
plague psychology bas contaminated the American imagination, to gauge the viability 
of dissent and resistance in so corporatist a system, and to discover if, in fact, the 
possibility for the existential and the revolutionary in American life could somehow 
be rescued from the technocrats. Mailer is not, in the book, arguing for special status 
or even attempting an interpretation of the historical event on which he bas chosen to 
focus in order to attend to these matters-in fact Mailer asserts early on in the novel 
that "the March on the Pentagon was an ambiguous event whose essential value or 
absurdity may or may not be established for ten or twenty years, or indeed ever" 
1 Mailer's growing awareness of the impossibility of politics in America was 
suggested by Paul Levine in his article ''Norman Mailer's Civil War" in his 
discussion of Mailer's Cannibals and Christians. 
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(Mailer 1968 64). Rather, he approaches the march as a symbolic event, a chance to 
test the dialectic vitality of American politics. ln The Presidential Papers Mailer 
laments that .. the play of political ideas is flaccid here in America because opposing 
armies never meet" (Mailer 1964 25). The question Mailer explores in The Armies of 
the Night is whether or not the symbolic battle between "the villains who were 
hippies" and the .. corporation-land villains" (Mailer 1968 108) turned out, in reality, 
to be as impotent as the ideological struggle between Cummings and Hearn in The 
Naked and the Dead. 
The answer, for Mailer, rests primarily on the possibility of a revitalized 
political Left in America, a Left able to free itself from its adoration of what Mailer 
calls the .. sound-as-a-brickwork-logic-of-the-next-step," that is, the logic of the 
technocrat, and to rediscover the imar.inative aspect of democracy and the existential 
value of dissent and the revolutionary. Those in authority, as Mailer sees it, have a 
vested interest in the predictable, in controlling and managing politics and political 
action to the point where the very essence of democracy is lost, and politics is 
transformed from a process for the expression of a country's creativity and 
progressive energy, into a mere matter of ensuring continuity and stability. Mailer's 
hope for the March was that it represented a new political aesthetic for the Left, an 
aesthetic that embraced the beauty of possibility, and the existential necessity of risk. 
The aesthetic of the New Left now therefore began with the notion that 
authority could not comprehend nor contain nor finally manage to control any 
political action whose end was unknown. They could attack it, beat it, jail it, 
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misrepresent it, and finally abuse it, but they could not feel a sense of victory 
because they could not understand a movement which inspired thousands and 
hundreds of thousands to march without a coordinated plan. ( 1 02) 
In a corporatist society the very notion of a politics which appeals to what is most 
imaginative in people, based on beliefs rather than systemic imperatives, and 
proposing vision and risk rather than greater organization and the emotional comfort 
of stability, is a challenge to prevailing logic and a danger to those who would have 
us believe that rational analysis and efficient administration are the only basis for a 
system of government. 
In the promise of the March Mailer detects the first faint pounding of a .. new 
drum of the Left." In the postwar period, Mailer contends, "the Left had been ... the 
secret unwitting accomplice of every increase in power of the technicians, 
bureaucrats, and labor leaders who ran the governmental military-industrial complex 
of super-technology land" (108). In the hands of the technocrats of both the Right 
and the Left, democracy had been drained of one of its essential 
elements-tension-the productive coexistence and conflict of opposing visions for 
the country which, along with individual empowerment and responsibility, constitute 
the life blood of American democracy for Mailer. 
Unimaginative and dominated by .. middle-class political organizations," the 
Left mirrored, if it did not inspire, the self-indulgence and professionalized self-
interestedness of the technocratic classes that had done so much damage to American 
individualism. For Mailer the best manner for assuring the continuing possibility of 
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the revolutionary within a democracy bas always been the nurturing and protection of 
the power of the individual citizen. Further to that, it is Mailer's contention that the 
responsibility lies with the individual citizen for arbitrating the necessity and scope of 
revolutionary action. Organizations, political interest groups, leftist sects, and all of 
the '"alphabet soup" of liberal causes are fine for proposing certain programs and 
organizing protests, but in the long run, as Mailer argues, they serve "as piping 
systems for the brain, and flushing systems for the heart" (Mailer 1968 Ill) inspiring 
only self-pity, self-righteousness, and mediocrity, and taking the emphasis off the 
political consciousness of individuals-so vital for a democracy-and focusing 
instead on producing political technocrats who are only capable of running, or 
serving, large organizations. 
Mailer detects the presence of a corporatist spirit in a political left so 
dependent on organization and organizations. For this reason Mailer: 
Scorned the organizational aspects of revolution, the speeches, mimeograph 
machines, the hard dull maneuvering, to keep power, the intolerable 
obedience of each objective period ... such revolutions were the womb and 
cradle of technology land. (92) 
Mailer refers to the various sects, groups, clubs, and committees which seem to 
dominate Leftist politics in America as being "like rusty tin cans .. .in the apocalyptic 
garden of his revolution" ( 1 09). He goes on to say '"that the best to be said was that 
they were probably like vitamins, injurious to a healthy stomach, smelling like the 
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storeroom of a pharmacology company's warehouse, doubtless productive of cancer 
over the long haul, but essential perhaps, perhaps! to a Left forever suffering from 
malnutrition" ( 11 0). In his critique of The Armies of the Night Robert Meridith 
responds to Mailer's views on the organizational impulse of the Left by suggesting 
that, 
Mailer's view of left organizations has little or nothing to do with reality 
because it has nothing or very little to do with making a revolution. 
Revolutions are made, in part, by organizations and orders of men engaged in 
extended struggles, and they are prepared for, in part by organizing and 
organizers and organizations. ( 445) 
Merideth asserts that Mailer resistance to organizations is "a form of liberal posturing 
posing as radical perception" (445); the gist of Meridith's critique is, in short, that 
Mailer spurns organization because be is, at heart, a liberal and not a revolutionary. 
This is, I would argue, a useful assessment of Mailer's position in the novel, 
though I do not believe that Mailer could be accused of making claims to being a 
revolutionary, at least not in the sense that Meridith uses the term; Mailer's Left 
Conservatism, his term to describe the nature of his politics, is best summed up in his 
belief that "radical measures were sometimes necessary to save the root" (Mailer 
1968 207). Mailer is more interested in the possibility of the revolutionary, and of 
radical politics, than be is any specific revolution. For Mailer the March represented 
a significant political opportunity to reaftlrm the existential nature of democracy, to 
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prove to those in authority that not every aspect of America could be managed, that it 
was still possible, in America, to practice a kind of political action whose end was 
unknown, which could inspire "thousands and hundreds of thousands to march 
without a coordinated plan" (62). What Mailer confronts, as both a participant and 
observer of the March, is the increasing impossibility of such a politics in 
contemporary corporatist America. 
Saddled with squabbling factions, conflicting demands, and inflexible interest 
groups, the focus of the March, for those organizing it, quickly shifted from its ideals 
of mass disobedience and the expression of individual protest to an exercise in 
coalition management and interest arbitration. In a particularly instructive tum of 
events, the Mobilization Committee, a coalition of leftist groups committed to the 
March, in order to keep moderate peace groups, with their significant membership 
and influence, on board, found itself in negotiations with government representatives 
concerning the particulars of the proposed March. Mailer, with great irony, describes 
the mood of one such meeting as "not too dissimilar, although probably less intense, 
than an arbitration proceeding between a corporation and a union," finding it 
impossible to resist adding that "any time two bodies of men whose names end in 
Mobilization and Administration get together, even a revolution can be negotiated" 
(264).2 Mailer recognizes in these meetings a new political paradigm for American 
politics, which, considering his description, could fairly be characterized as 
corporatist: 
2 Mailer is referring here to the General Service Administration, which was the 
government body assigned to negotiate with the Mobilization Committee. 
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In fact, the meetings could have served as another paradigm of American 
civilization in this decade of the twentieth century, for two groups with 
absolutely incompatible ends and an irretrievable lack of final resolution 
between them, were nonetheless adjudicators in effect with one another over 
the few small items of common ground which were negotiable, and this 
through its sheer instrumentalism-since it is somewhat more difficult to take 
militant action after negotiating quietly with one's enemy for weeks-was to 
work to pacify and finally curtail the more unmanageable aspects of the 
Antiwar March. (264) 
In the end the two sides reached an agreement, through negotiation and compromise, 
and the demonstration proceeded by pennit. 
In The Armies of the Night Mailer revisits the argument that he first offered 
through Lt. Hearn in The Naked and the Dead-that there was very little chance of 
the Left being successful if it entered into the battle of organization which would 
increasingly constitute what would pass for politics in post-war America. From 
Mailer's perspective, a Left which allowed itself to be drawn into a political culture 
obsessed with structure, technique, and the relinquishing of individual citizenship in 
favor of association and interest politics would become so compromised, so complicit 
in the larger corporatist organization of America, that it would soon find itself in 
danger of being completely absorbed, of disappearing into the stable and mediocre 
realm of the transpolitical, of becoming just another l or 0 in .. the absolute computer 
of the corporation" (21 0). Such a Left, functioning as just another interest group or 
para-bureaucratic organization, would surely only further diminish the state of 
democracy in a period of American history already increasingly dominated by the 
power of the technocrat. 
47 
Chapter Two 
Corporatism's New Deal: Liberal Entropy in Thomas Pynchon's Domestic Novels 
"I believe we are on an irreversible trend toward more freedom and 
democracy-but that could change." 
--Vice President Dan Quayle, Dan Quayle in His Own Words 
In the preface to his volume of essays entitled The Liberal Imagination published in 
1950, liberal critic and intellectual Lionel Trilling famously wrote: 
In the United States at this time liberalism is not only the dominant but even 
the sole intellectual tradition. For it is the plain fact that nowadays there are 
no conservative or reactionary ideas in general circulation. (ix) 
As alien as such a sentiment may sound in the post-Reagan era of American politics, 
where the term "liberal" is often viewed and treated as the political equivalent of 
leprosy, Trilling's statement demonstrates the grip that liberalism had on the political, 
cultural and social consciousness ofpost-WW II America. Modem American 
liberalism, and its accompanying set of ideas and policies that had descended from 
Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal, shaped the American early post-war period 
with its promise of continued prosperity, greater political stability, and a broader 
sense of fairness for the country. In the late 1940's and throughout the 1950's, the 
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achievements of liberalism seemed evident everywhere: the American economy was 
growing, postwar prosperity combined with New Deal social policies helped to lift 
millions of Americans out of the despair of poverty, and liberals of all kinds were 
backing the emerging civil rights movement. Most liberals, like Trilling, were 
confident that conservatism and other anti-liberal forces inhabited only the margins of 
American life, and posed no real threat to the continued centrality and durability of 
liberal ideas. 
Of course, the liberal confidence of the early post-war era would prove short 
lived for by the mid 1960's liberalism's seeming invulnerability had begun to erode 
and the process of liberalism's decline, culminating with the election of Ronald 
Reagan in 1980, began to gain momentum. Historians and political scientists have 
offered various explanations for liberalism's collapse in post-war America and, as 
one might expect, the subject remains a matter of some contention. One of the more 
compelling arguments, particularly considering our purposes, is the notion that 
beginning in the 1930's with the set of political initiatives that constituted 
Roosevelt's New Deal, liberalism in America underwent an ideological change of 
direction and began down the path of what Theodore Lowi calls "interest group 
liberalism," a path that sowed the seeds for the kind of corporatist system that took 
root and eventually blossomed in America after WW U. As a result, a chasm soon 
began to open up between the values and ideals espoused by American liberalism-
equality, individualism, participatory democracy, concern for the disadvantaged, 
justice, etc.--and the reality of the America that was being shaped by corporatist 
policies disguised as liberal politics. It is the argument of this chapter that Thomas 
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Pynchon 's two most American novels-The Crying of Lot 49 and Vineland --offer an 
astute, though often circuitous, exploration of this chasm. 
In The Crying of Lot 49 and Vineland Pynchon depicts a postmodem America 
that is, at least partially, the legacy of a failure of liberal idealism in America. 
America's liberal tradition, with its strong belief in individual political freedoms and 
democratic governance, is front and center in Pynchon's fiction, not as an object of 
cynicism or parody, but as a matter of utmost relevance to his vision of contemporary 
America. Critical attempts to come to terms with this vision have often led those 
Pynchon scholars interested in the political aspects of his fiction to characterize 
Pynchon's politics as nihilistic or absurdist, as constituting what Lois Tyson refers to 
as Pynchon's "politics of despair" (Tyson 8). It is my argument here that, while 
Pynchon' s engagement with postmodem America does indeed include a substantial 
and recognizable political perspective, that perspective is not best understood as a 
kind of convenient nihilism, postmodem pessimism, or epistemological relativism. 
Rather Pynchon is first and foremost a liberal, though most certainly a discontented 
one, who attributes much of the responsibility for the ascent of corporatism and the 
decline of democracy in America to the winding down of the liberal spirit and its 
gross ineffectuality in the face of the many political, social and cultural challenges of 
post WW II America. 
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The Crying of Lot 49 and tbe Legacy of New Deal Liberalism 
In the Crying of Lot 49, Oedipa Maas, a typical Californian housewife 
comfortably married and ensconced in suburbia, is drawn out of her middle-class 
consumer hibernation by a summons to travel to San Narcisco to execute the will of 
her recently departed ex-lover, tycoon, and corporate capitalist extraordinaire Pierce 
Inverarity. Oedipa's journey down the state highway into the heart ofpostmodem 
America provides a rich opportunity for Pynchon to comment on and parody such 
ripe subject matter as consumer culture, silicon-obsessed Southern California, and the 
pervasiveness of television in American cultural and social life. However, it is the 
umbrageous presence of Pierce lnverarity which is of principal concern to us, and 
which offers the key to Pynchon's political perspective in the novel. 
Chasing after Inverarity's legacy, Oedipa is soon overwhelmed by the 
complexity and scope of the shadow that he bas cast over the social and political 
landscape of her beloved America. Jerry A. Varsava argues that, when approached as 
an ideological critique, Inverarity's presence in the novel exemplifies the values of 
libertarianism, in particular economic libertarianism, an ideology that raises 
unfettered capitalism and the pursuit of individual interest to the status of moral 
absolutes. Discussing Inverarity's ubiquity in the novel, Varsava writes: 
The vestiges of this rogue entrepreneur are apparent everywhere that Oedipa 
looks-in the multiplying conspiracies, in the tangled web of his commercial 
enterprises, in the urban sprawl of Southern California, and, most notably, in 
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the rigid economic stratification that defines American society. All of these 
conditions can ultimately be traced back to Inverarity's (and unnamed others') 
successful pursuit of the ideals of economic libertarianism. (70) 
Certainly In veracity can be read as the incarnation of the destructive nature of greed 
and economic inequality in American society. However, I would hesitate to lay the 
blame for the social, political, and economic concerns that Varsava lists solely at the 
feet of an ideology, however objectionable, whose ideals had more or less been 
relegated to the political margins during the period in question-a period which 
historians Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle argue was dominated by ·~ew Deal[ ... ] 
ideas, public policies, and political alliances" (ix). 
Certainly the kind of unfettered capitalism that is the economic system of 
choice for libertarians was much in evidence in America in the early part of the 
twentieth century. Highly unregulated and unresponsive to progressive social ideas, 
the capitalist elite in America, those whom Roosevelt in his inaugural speech referred 
to as "the rulers of the exchange of mankind's goods," pursued the production of 
capital and accumulation of individual wealth largely unrestrained by regulatory 
institutions or interventionist state policies. The result was, of course, the high 
unemployment and social distress of the Great Depression. 
Taking office in 1933, at the height of the greatest economic collapse in 
American history, President Franklin Roosevelt promised America a "new deal" and 
introduced a flurry of policies and government initiatives designed to attend to the 
many immediate problems of the Great Depression, as well as to frame reforms to 
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provide the federal government with a larger, hopefully stabilizing, influence on 
America's economic and social development. The notion that the state had a 
significant role to play in the way that capitalism functions in America had its origins 
in the progressive reform movements of the early twentieth century, which 
recognized the social and political dangers of large corporations having too much 
power and influence over the lives of individuals and over the American economy as 
a whole. The New Deal promised to institutionalize this progressive spirit by 
recognizing that capitalism in America needed to be saved from itself, and that a duly 
elected democratic government, concerned with the plight of the individual citizen 
and prepared to enact significant social and economic reforms, was the instrument 
best suited for the job. This fundamentally anti·libertarian project became the basis 
for modem American liberalism. 
That "New Deal liberalism" was not entirely consistent with the strong belief 
in "laissez-faire" capitalism that characterized traditional American liberalism, and 
yet was supported with enthusiasm by liberals of the period, is a strong indication of 
just how out of favor libertarian ideals had become. As Brian J. Cook argues, 
Roosevelt's redefinition of liberalism was in fact a shifting of liberal ideology away 
from its traditional emphasis on economic liberty towards an emphasis on pragmatic 
reform, a shift which significantly changed the liberal understanding of the role of 
government in American life: 
Roosevelt had to label his program distinctively and banish to the political 
wilderness any opponents who might claim the same label. FDR achieved 
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this by adopting the title "liberal" and forcing his opponents to accept the 
designation "conservative." [ ... ] This was an especially meaningful 
achievement, for the American creed was fundamentally liberal. According to 
John Dewey, the creed consisted of two strains ofliberalism-laissez-faire 
and humanitarian-with the former dominant and latter associated with 
personal and voluntary effort. FOR successfully raised the political status of 
humanitarian liberalism and redefined it in connection with government 
activism, generating a still-increasing sharp competition between the two 
streams of liberal thought-now in the guise of liberalism and conservatism. 
(106) 
While Cook implies that the term "liberal," as it was applied by Roosevelt to the 
amalgam of initiatives, policies and ideas that constituted the New Deal, reflected 
Roosevelt's keen political sense more than his ideological sympathy, the fact remains 
that New Deal liberalism, with its emphasis on the expansion of state intervention in 
social and economic matters central to American life, was the dominant force in 
America's political culture well into the post-war era. 
If Inverarity's story is indeed the story of contemporary America, as the novel 
repeatedly suggests, then I would argue that the social and economic conditions that 
Oedipa discovers in his wake are more the result of the failure of contemporary 
American liberalism than the success of lnverarity's libertarian ideals. The story of 
Pierce Inverarity appears to be that of just another successful American capitalist. 
However, his legacy is given form and meaning, not by Inverarity the man, but by 
Oedipa, by her obsessive drive to reconcile the America she thought she inherited, 
with the poverty, disenfranchisement, and paranoia she confronts on her journey 
through postmodem America. 
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Oedipa, as a child of the Cold War, self·described as being nurtured on the 
principles of .. Secretaries James and Foster and Senator Joseph, those dear daft 
numina," referring of course to three prominent American Cold War ideologues, 
inherited an America with a clearly defined enemy and an accompanying faith in its 
sense of itself as the great symbiosis of democracy and capitalism. This central 
liberal notion, that democracy and capitalism can coexist in America, intertwined as 
the great systemic guarantors of equality and liberty, is one Oedipa finds impossible 
to reconcile with the economic despair and social and political alienation which she 
seems to uncover around every comer. Oedipa discovers, and is forced to deal with, 
an America where the great systemic symbiosis seems to have broken down, where, 
rather than working together to ensure a healthy balance between individual freedom 
and civic equality, capitalism and democracy appear to be working at cross·purposes 
at all levels of American life. Determined to make whatever sense she can of the 
"scatter of business interests that bad survived Inverarity," Oedipa begins to sense 
that while America's liberal order seems to be deteriorating, another order, its ideals 
less determinate and its nature less conspicuous than liberalism's, an order which is 
somehow tied to Inverarity, is tightening its grip on America. 
In this regard the textual evidence that Jerry Varsava provides to justify his 
characterization of Inverarity as .. a paragon of libertarian beroicism" points 
constructively in another ideological direction-though I would like to argue that the 
orientation in question is more decisively described as corporatist than libertarian 
(71). Varsava writes: 
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Yoyodyne Inc., a large defense contractor-suggestive ofPynchon's onetime 
employer, Boeing-comes into view and with it the specter of the "military-
industrial complex" President Eisenhower warned America about in 1961, just 
before leaving office. (Indeed, Eisenhower realized that the military-
industrial complex posed a threat to American liberty and justice 
unprecedented in the nation's history.) A major shareholder in Yoyodyne, 
Inverarity, after the fashion of the robber baron, secretly arranged the special 
tax break that brought the company to this location in the first place. 
Inverarity's machinations give new meaning to Adam Smith's notion of the 
"invisible hand." (In a perverse, libertarian reading of civitas, Inverarity sees 
his self-interested scheming as the proper office of a ufounding father" [26].) 
(71) 
What emboldens a self-interested capitalist like lnverarity to legitimize himself as a 
"founding father" is a political environment in which the collaboration between the 
state and the interests of capital encourages the development of quasi-governmental 
structures and dangerously influential private interests groups. Such a political 
environment is made manifest in the novel, as Varsava rightly indicates, by the 
imposing presence of Yoyodyne Inc. and the .. military industrial complex" that it 
suggests. Inverarity's statesmanlike status is indicative of the emerging corporatist 
reality of postwar America's political development, a reality that Alan Brinkley 
describes in this passage from Liberalism and its Discontents: 
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In the postwar era there emerged [ ... ] what became, in a sense, a second 
government: a national security state, powerful, entrenched, constantly 
expanding, and largely invulnerable to political attacks; a state that forged 
intimate partnerships with the corporate world, constantly blurring the 
distinctions between public and private; and a state that produced some of the 
very things-strengthened private monopolies and expanded state power to 
sustain them-that the liberal vision was supposed to prevent. 
Certainly Inverarity's actions in The Crying of Lot 49 are in his own interests, but 
behind each of his "machinations" is a corporatist-style relationship to a state 
structure or governmental function that plays an instrumental role in his success. 
Corporatism as Conspiracy 
Corporatism, as a political or ideological system, is very rarely associated 
with the United States, a country whose historical traditions are strongly 
.. liberal"-that is, steeped in a belief in individual freedom and representative 
democracy. However, it is the case that America, in the twentieth century, has seen an 
increase in the influence and practice of corporatism, though it is seldom identified as 
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such. Americans tend to be profoundly uncomfortable with non-liberal political 
ideologies and thus, as Howard J. Wirada reasons, "if corporatism is ever to find a 
foothold in the United States, it bas to come in through the back door, disguised and 
by stealth, and be called 'liberalism' rather than 'corporatism"' (132). 
In the 1930's, corporatist forces found just such a back door in the redefinition 
of liberalism that accompanied the experimental atmosphere of the New Deal. The 
National Recovery Administration (NRA)-an agency created out of legislation 
which Roosevelt passed in his famed "First Hundred Days"-was overtly corporatist 
in the way it was given the authority to assist private economic interests in organizing 
business associations which, along with organized labor and government 
representatives, would establish production quotas, price rates, wage rates and codes 
of conduct for America's industrial sectors. As historian Alan Brinkley writes, "The 
NRA [ . . . ] has often been described, with considerable justification, as an effort to 
create an American form of corporatism," and while it was ruled unconstitutional by 
the Supreme Court after just over a year of disastrous implementation, it legitimized 
corporatist ideas and practices as fundamental aspects of American liberalism. While 
Pynchon makes no direct mention of the NRA, or of the New Deal for that matter, in 
The Crying of Lot 49, I would argue that it is instructive to keep in mind bow the 
legitimization of corporatist ideas and values as an ideological legacy of New Deal 
liberalism-a development that I have argued provides a useful historical context in 
which to consider the political significance of the nature of Pierce Inverarity's 
success in the novel-contributes to the postwar political atmosphere of secrecy and 
paranoia that Pyncbon portrays in The Crying of Lot 49. 
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The pervasiveness of secrecy, in a corporatist society, is a direct result of the 
confusion between public and private that arises when private interest groups are 
allowed to function as quasi-governmental agencies without democratic legitimacy 
and beyond the standards of transparency that are supposed to govern public 
processes in a democracy. Corporatism invites secrecy into the political process, not 
just as a means for protecting state secrets-that is in the interest of the public 
good-but rather in the service of private interests as an effective means for the 
exercise of power. Power, in a corporatist society, consistently flows towards those 
who develop, understand, and control the structures of organized interests that 
dominate the political process and dictate the direction of public policy. Therefore, 
the possession, manipulation, and control of information within organizations and 
systems, rather than its democratic communication, becomes paramount-in a 
corporatist political environment secrecy is both a political and a systemic 
imperative. 
Such a system treats secrecy, not as a specific tool for the concealment of 
particularly sensitive facts or bits of information, but as a general condition for all 
knowledge; everything is secret unless it is incompetently controlled, or there is a 
conscious decision to the contrary. Citizens are encouraged to accept both the 
presence and the influence of non-democratic and publicly taciturn organizations as a 
normative aspect of the political process. In such a hyper-organized and closely 
guarded environment, individual citizens are often led to perceive information which 
they do not know, that which is .. kept" secret, no matter its actual worth, as inherently 
fascinating and, by mere virtue of its secrecy, particularly valuable. 
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Rather than encouraging a democratic dissemination of information and an 
atmosphere of empowered citizenship, corporatism encourages the careful control of 
even the most innocuous bits of infonnation, creating an atmosphere of paranoia and 
paralysis in which citizens begin to constantly question the availability of 
information, and thus their ability to make decisions and form opinions. In short, the 
corporatist normalization of secrecy as part of the political process endangers 
democratic praxis by undermining the confidence of individuals in the power of their 
democratic citizenship. John Ralston Saul describes the corrosive nature of pervasive 
secrecy on a democracy in this passage from Voltaire's Bastards: 
The generalized secret has introduced such a terrible uncertainty into our 
society that citizens' confidence in their own ability to judge public matters 
has been damaged. They constantly complain that they don't know enough to 
make up their own minds. They have a feeling that the mass of information 
available would not be available if it were truly worth having. The result is a 
despondent mental anarchy which prevents them from actively using the 
considerable powers democratic society has won. They are convinced that 
essential information is being held back. (288) 
Thus when, in The Crying of Lot 49, Nefastis states that "Communication is the key," 
he may be making a scientific argument ( 1 OS). However Pynchon makes it clear in 
the novel that Nefastis's observation also has political implications; to understand the 
state of communication in postmodem America is to gain profound insight into the 
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state of its politics. 
The conspiracy that Oedipa pursues in the novel is, of course, the 
communication network ofTristero, an underground postal system that, despite its 
secretive nature, seems present everywhere in the form of its emblematic postal hom. 
However, the real conspiracy that Oedipa unwittingly uncovers, if it can be 
characterized as such, is the not so secret control that various organized interests, in 
particular corporations, have over the lines of communication in America. One of the 
over-arching ironies of the novel is that despite the historically unique opportunity for 
connectedness and increased community offered by the accelerated development of 
communication technology in postmodem America, communication networks are 
treated as nothing more than a "cash nexus'' for increasingly massive corporations 
like Yoyodyne Inc. 
Tristero, for Pynchon, represents the erosion of liberal democracy that marks 
this corporate control of communication in America: 
For here were God knew how many citizens, deliberately choosing not to 
communicate by U.S. Mail. It was not an act of treason, nor possibly even of 
defiance. But it was a calculated withdrawal, from the life of the Republic, 
from its machinery. Whatever else was being denied them out of hate, 
indifference to the power of their vote, loopholes, simple ignorance, this 
withdrawal was their own, unpublicized, private. (124-125) 
Of course Tristero also represents the possibility of resistance for Pynchon, the hope 
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that indeed "there had to exist [a] separate, silent, unsuspected world" (Pynchon 
1986, 92) where diversity, individual ingenuity, and ''a network by which X number 
of Americans are truly communicating" can exist apart from the corporate and 
corporatist surface of American social and political life ( 170). 
Of course the great question of the novel always remains-is Oedipa' s 
determination to "create constellations" from the apparent disorder of Inverarity's 
affairs the result of paranoia, or of a fortuitous unearthing of a perversely complicated 
intrigue-the shadowy Tristero conspiracy? Critics often call attention to the fact 
that this question remains unanswered and unresolved by the novel's conclusion. 
Oedipa is left unsure of herself, certain only of two possibilities that she is willing to 
entertain: 
Either Oedipa in the orbiting ectasy of a true paranoia, or a real Tristero. For 
there either was some Tristero behind the appearance of the legacy America, 
or there was just America and if there was just America then it seemed the 
only way she could continue, and manage to be at all relevant to it, was as an 
alien, unfurrowed, assumed full circle into some paranoia. ( 182) 
What is not given consideration often enough, however, is that both 
conditions-secrecy and paranoia-are not mutually exclusive as solutions to 
Oedipa's dilemma, but are rather intimately linked symptoms of the dilemma itself, 
measures of a larger political and social system that is able to employ both to its 
distinct advantage. 
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What frustrates Oedipa most about Inverarity is not what his legacy 
communicates-greed, wealth and influence--but what it fails to communicate, what 
she is convinced it is hiding about the nature and structure of power in America. 
Haunted by the ghostly shadow of destructive self-interest-Pierce Inverarity-and 
surrounded by signs of the decline of liberal democracy-most prominently the 
ubiquitous post-hom symbol which comes to represent alienation, indifference, and 
the growing "withdrawal from the life of the Republic"-Oedipa's paranoia is, in 
itself, a good indication of just how far she, and by extension American society, has 
strayed from any meaningful affinity with liberalism and democratic citizenship. 
During a discussion of the importance of"the system" in Pynchon's wor~ Joseph 
Slade alludes to the larger political implications of paranoia when he describes it as: 
A secondary illumination with one advantage: that it may drive the individual 
to recognize that the system does exist and that he is a pawn: and with the 
greater disadvantage: that it may encourage him to view himself as helpless 
victim and thus to shirk human responsibility. (65) 
Either way paranoia sustains the notion that systems of power in America are best 
understood as corporatist, based on private interests and closed organizations, rather 
than democratic, transparent, rooted in the informed judgement of the individual 
citizen, and concerned with the public good. 
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The Erosion of LiberaUsm in Vineltllrd 
A couple of decades after Oedipa sets off for San Narcisco in search of 
lnverarity's legacy, Pynchon revisited California as the setting for Vineland, his 
Reagan-era drama of compromised ex-hippies, power-mad bureaucrats, and media-
saturated teenage nihilists. Like Lot 49, in Vineland Pynchon is clearly concerned 
with developments in America's political direction, once again focusing his gaze on 
the ascension of corportism, the dissipation of liberal progressivism, the corporate 
tyranny of post-industrial capitalism and the threat of the development of a new style 
of fascism in contemporary America. However, the historical context of Vineland is 
profoundly different from that of Lot 49. The Crying of Lot 49 is a novel that 
certainly confronts the social and political problems which beset America in the early 
post-war period, but it also boldly looks forward to the radicalization of political 
consciousness that would characterize leftist progressivism in the second half of the 
1960's. Oedipa Maas, Pynchon's representative of an America rediscovering the 
importance of engaged citizenship, political activism, and the questioning of 
authority, gives way, in Vineland, to Frenesi Gates, who, it could be argued, 
represents an America in which the progressive left has become so co-opted, its 
fundamental liberal ideals so compromised, that as an ideological force it has more or 
less disappeared from the mainstream of American politics- a political reality that 
the election of Ronald Reagan as President in 1980 made unmistakably manifest. 
One of the more significant signs of this co-option and dissipation of liberalism is the 
political decline of social progressivism, particularly the corruption of the labor 
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movement in America since the end of WW U, and the stunted development of a new 
progressive left in the 1960's and 197C's, subjects that gamer a lot of attention in 
Vineland. 
The decline of the labor movement, the demoralization of the New Left and 
the counter-cultural revolution, and the ascension of Reagan and ideological "neo-
conservatism," three major events which define the eclipse ofpost-WWII American 
liberalism, are recounted and explored in Vineland via the history of three generations 
of the Becker family. In this manner Pynchon is able to present the historical 
evolution of the postwar political situation in America, as well as reveal how 
American liberalism, once so progressive and passionate, has descended into its 
present degraded state. 
The American trade union movement in the immediate pre-war era, as 
Pynchon depicts it through the stories told to Frenesi by her mother Sasha, was a 
vibrant, active and growing movement. Profoundly angered by her father's crippling 
at the hands of Croker "Bud" Scantling, a member of an anti-union organization 
called the "Employers' Association," Sasha leaves home and settles in a "rip-roaring 
union town, still riding the waves of euphoria from the General Strike of '34" and 
proceeds to involve herself in the local labor struggles (77). 
Growing up, Frenesi heard stories of those prewar times, the strike at the 
Stockton cannery, strikes over Ventura sugar beets, Venice lettuce, San 
Joaquin cotton ... of the anticonscription movement in Berkeley ... 
Somewhere Sasha had also found time to work for Tom Mooney's release, 
fight the infamous antipicket ordinance, Proposition One, and campaign for 
Culbert Olsen in '38. (77) 
Then WW II came along and, as Sasha recounts for Frenesi, for herself and for the 
American labor movement: 
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The war changed everything. The deal was, no strikes for the duration. Lot 
of us thought it was some last desperate capitalist maneuver, a way to get the 
Nation mobilized under a Leader, no different than Hitler or Stalin. But at the 
same time, so many of us really loved FDR. (77) 
Indeed labor in America did enter into economic arrangements with business and 
government in the interests of mobilization and wartime production. FDR had set the 
stage for such co-operation by passing legislation such as the National Labor 
Relations Act, which guaranteed collective bargaining rights for workers, and by 
creating the National Labor Relations Board, which was given the authority to police 
unfair labor practices. While FOR's policies made organized labor more powerful 
than at any time in American history, they also succeeded in wedding labor to New 
Deal liberalism by corporatizing it, that is, by making the relationship between labor 
and capital a matter of institutional governmental process and thus subject to, and 
dependent on, the constantly shifting legislative and political environment of state 
structures and systems. 
When the need to mobilize for war arose, Roosevelt sought to greatly 
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strengthen this New Deal tripartite partnership between government, capital, and 
labor in order to provide the economic stability and promote the increased production 
necessary to accomplish the massive task of preparing for war. The theory was that 
both business and labor would subordinate their own interests under the direction of 
the government in order to serve the larger interests of the public good. However, as 
Pynchon reminds us in Gravity's Rainbow, referring specifically to WW II: "Don't 
forget the real business of the War is buying and selling[ ... ]. The true war is a 
celebration of markets" (lOS). It was the interests of capital that dominated much of 
the agenda and policies of the War Industries Board, the bureaucratic entity which 
oversaw the bulk of America's mobilization effort, largely because the agency was 
staffed "almost entirely from the private sector, relying on lawyers, businessmen, and 
financiers (many of them drawn directly from the industries they were then called 
upon to regulate)" (Brinkley 83). 
Labor was never able to achieve anything like equal standing in this wartime 
partnership, while capital, able to dominate and manipulate the central mobilization 
agencies, reaped enormous profits and solidified its influence over the regulatory 
mechanisms and bureaucracy of the New Deal state. Thus Hub Gates, returning from 
fighting the war, confronted a vastly different political situation in America, a 
situation in which the wartime arrangements between government and capital 
provided the framework for a postwar state and conservative politics that was 
explicitly anti-union. 
Participating in one of the wave of postwar strikes, Hub is confronted with 
this new political reality for labor: 
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The struggle between the lA TSE [International Alliance of Theatrical Stage 
Employees], a creature of organized crime in collusion with the studio, and 
Herb Sorell's Conference of Studio Unions, unapologetically liberal, 
progressive, New Deal, socialist, and thus, in the toxic political situation, 
"Communist," had been going on all through the war but now broke into the 
open in a series of violent strike actions against the studios. All the 
newspapers pretended it was an organizing dispute between two unions. In 
fact it was the dark recrudescence of that hard-cased antiunion tradition which 
brought the movie business to California in the first place, where it had gone 
on to enjoy till only recently its free ride on the backs of cheap labor. The 
minute this was threatened, in came the studio-created scab locals of lA TSE 
and their soldiers, often in battalion strength. And the outcome was 
foredoomed, because of the blacklist. In one of American misoneism's most 
notable hours, a complex system of accusation, judgement, and disposition, 
administered by figures like Roy Brewer of lA TSE and Ronald Reagan of the 
Screen Actors Guild, controlled the working lives of everyone in the industry 
who'd ever taken a step leftward of registering to vote as a Democrat. (289-
90) 
The clear contrast between the co-opted and fragmented situation of organized labor 
in post-war America reflected in the above passage, and Jess Traverse's pre-war 
"dream of One Big Union" (76) shows Pynchon's acute awareness of the crippling 
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effect of the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, a piece of legislation which confirmed 
that the kind of political influence enjoyed by business interests during the war, vis-a-
vis its wartime economic partnerships with the state, continued to dominate public 
life in the postwar period. Historian Nelson Lichtenstein describes the impact and 
importance of the Taft-Hartly Act in the following passage: 
Passage of the Taft-Hartley Act over President Truman's veto proved a 
milestone, not only for the actual legal restrictions the new law imposed on 
the trade unions, but as a symbol of the shifting relationship between the 
unions and the state during the late 1940s. The law sought to curb the practice 
of interunion solidarity, eliminate the radical cadre who still held influence 
within trade union ranks, and contain the labor movement to roughly its 
existing geographic and demographic terrain. The anti-Communist affidavits, 
the prohibition against secondary boycotts, the enactment of section 14b 
allowing states to prohibit the union shop, the ban on foreman unionism-all 
these sections of the law had been on the agenda of the National Association 
of Manufacturers and other conservative groups since 1938 [ ... ]. Union 
leaders correctly recognized that the act represented the definitive end of the 
brief era in which the state served as an arena in which the trade unions could 
bargain for the kind of tripartite accommodation with industry that bad been 
so characteristic of the New Deal years. (133-34) 
Stripped of its most powerful organizational tools by Taft-Hartley, and ideologically 
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neutered by the chilling effect of the Cold War on American domestic politics, labor 
began to abandon its progressive political agenda and "unions settled for guarantees 
of their own institutional survival and higher wages for their members" (Brinkley 
129). More or less abdicating the reformist and socially democratic ideals that 
defined it in the prewar period, American organized labor had been reduced from an 
active and expanding progressive force on the American political scene before the 
war, to the status of a mere special-interest group after it. As for Hub Gates, he sums 
up the capitulation of the labor movement to the developing corporatist organization 
of America with his own short personal story: "I let the world slip away, made my 
shameful peace, joined the lA, retired soon's I could, sold off my only real 
fortune-my precious anger-for a lot of got-damn shadows" (291 ). 
The kind of progressive and social democratic politics which characterized 
labor-liberalism in the prewar period, but had been driven to the margins of the 
American political scene by the period of conservative politics which narrowed the 
labor movement and further entrenched the systemic relationship between business 
interests and the state following the war, reappeared on the national political scene in 
the 1960's with the civil rights movement, the emergence of the New Left, and the 
explosion of political radicalism on the campuses of America's universities. 
Certainly Pynchon's sympathy with the democratic and progressive impulses and 
ideals of the sixties "revolution" can be strongly felt in Vineland. However, it is a 
novel that is written from a clear historical perspective, a perspective that has 
witnessed the almost complete evaporation of the progressive energy which drove the 
New Left, as well as the corruption of its democratic ideals by conservative and 
corporatist forces in America-a development allegorized in the novel by the co-
option ofFrenesi Gates by Brock Vond. 
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Brock's obsession with conformity and order is certainly depicted as out of 
control and destructive in Vineland. However, what is perhaps most politically 
disturbing is not Yond's maniacal and fascist behavior, as much as the fact that he is 
so easily able to convince Frenesi, a member of a family steeped in the history of the 
progressive struggles of the American left, to be a part of his plan to destroy "The 
People's Republic of Rock and Roll," perhaps the central representative of 
revolutionary ideals and spirit in the novel. Some critics, including Joseph Tabbi, 
have suggested that Brock Yond was able to turn Frenesi "mainly through the force 
of his sex" (96). However, Frenesi herself, at the very moment when Brock asks her 
to betray her friends and her ideals and help him bring about the dismantling of PR3, 
suggests a different reason, a motive which has very little, if not nothing, to do with 
Brock himself-
She understood as clearly as she could allow herself to what Brock wanted to 
do, understood at last, dismally, that she might even do it-not for him, 
unhappy fucker, but because she had lost just too much control, time was 
rushing all around her, these were rapids, and as far ahead as she could see it 
looked like Brock's stretch of river, another stage, like sex, children, surgery, 
further into adulthood perilous and real, into the secret that life is soldiering. 
(216) 
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Frenesi is not captivated by Brock's sexual prowess, at least not enough to betray her 
friends, but her desire for control, for order, for the stability that Brock represents 
compels her to accept his perverse conception of duty, and fulfill her role in the larger 
system as just another log making its way-here Pynchon extends the water motif of 
the above passage--"down the river to the sawmill, to get sawed into lumber, to be 
built into more America" (216). 
In Vineland Pynchon draws attention to this weakness, not just in Frenesi 
Gates, but in the sixties revolutionary movement as a whole. The generation which 
marched against the war in Vietnam, protested inequality, and fought for all manner 
of progressive and liberal causes was, finally, unable to resist the temptations that the 
forces of rational order, mass culture and consumer prosperity offered. In the end, 
Pynchon seems to judge the revolutionary spirit of the sixties and early seventies in 
America as hopeful and full of noble intentions, but too immature and self-indulgent 
to do little more than moderate the growing postwar trend in America to fashion its 
politics around the corporatist ideals of stability, prosperity, and organization above 
all else. In fact, Pynchon goes so far as to suggest that the sixties revolution may just 
have been a particular variation of that deeply felt desire for order and stability that 
propelled Reagan and the neo-conservatives to power in the eighties: 
Brock Yond's genius was to have seen in the activities of the sixties left not 
threats to order but unacknowledged desires for it. While the Tube was 
proclaiming youth revolutions against parents of all kinds and most viewers 
were accepting this story, Brock saw the deep--if he'd allowed himself to feel 
it, the sometimes touching-need only to stay children forever, safe inside 
some extended national Family. (269) 
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Pynchon's suggestion here, reinforced by Frenesi's relationship with Yond, is that 
postwar liberalism has betrayed its democratic ideals and compromised its social 
vision by collaborating with the forces of corporatist organization and structure that 
have dominated postwar America. 
In Gravity 's Rainbow Pynchon interrogates the nature of postwar power in 
America by insistently asking: "What terrible structure behind the appearance of 
diversity and enterprise?" ( 165). In Vineland this line of inquiry leads Pynchon to 
posit the presence of an underlying, but unspoken, continuity between the various 
ideologies, institutions, and political figures which have shaped the nature of postwar 
politics in America: 
One by one, as other voices joined in, the names began-some shouted, some 
accompanied by spit, the old reliable names good for hours of contention, 
stomach distress, and insomnia-Hitler, Roosevelt, Kennedy, Nixon, Hoover, 
Mafia, CIA, Reagan, Kissinger, that collection of names and their tragic 
interweaving that stood not constellated above in any nightwide remotenesses 
of light, but below, diminished to the last unfaceable American secret, to be 
pressed, each time deeper, again and again beneath the meanest of random 
soles, one blackly fermenting leaf on the forest floor, that nobody wanted to 
tum over, because of all that lived, virulent, waiting, just beneath. (372) 
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It has often been suggested that what Pynchon is concerned with here is a fascist 
presence in America. Indeed DL, Frenesi's friend and fellow radical in Vineland, 
accuses Ronald Reagan of wanting to "restore fascism" to America (265). And 
certainly Pynchon's depiction of the expanding police state structures under Nixon 
and Reagan seems to justify the on-going Traverse/Becker family debate concerning 
"the perennial question of whether the United States still lingered in a pre fascist 
twilight, or whether that darkness had fallen long stupefied years ago" (372). 
However, taking into consideration Pynchon's third Proverb for Paranoids: "If they 
can get you asking the wrong questions, they don't have to worry about answers" 
( 1973 25 1 ), I would argue that Pynchon is after something more insidious than 
fascism, something which in Gravity's Rainbow he calls the "corporate state" ( 419). 
Reagan and the new conservatives had no intention of establishing fascism in 
America. They knew enough not to attack liberal democracy itself, but rather to 
attack the way that liberal democracy functions, branding its basic 
institution-government-as inefficient, and its essential tenets-equality, individual 
citizenship and personal liberty-as inferior concerns to corporate prosperity, social 
order, and moral conformity. It is certainly true, as DL points out, that part of the 
Reagan program in the 1980's was to "flee into the past"(372). However, for 
Reagan, the glorious past he wished to emulate did not mean Germany in the 1930's, 
as DL's accusation of fascism implies, but rather America in the 1950's, and the 
postwar expansion of corporatism and quasi-governmental structures, along the lines 
of the "military industrial complex," that fmnly established the agenda ofbusiness at 
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the center of American public policy. This accounts for the unmistakable connection 
that Pynchon evokes, in Vineland. between the strongly polarized political spectrum 
and McCarthyism of the immediate postwar period in America, and the vociferous 
anti-liberalism and state-sponsored conformism of Reagan Republicanism. Reagan's 
program is presented by Pynchon as an attempt to reclaim America from the leftists, 
progressives, and revolutionaries of the sixties in order to shape a nation of 
"Americans all pulling their weight and all locked in to the official economy" (222). 
In the phrase "official economy" lurks a strong suggestion that Pynchon detects a 
marked corporatist tendency behind the Reagan Revolution. 
Pynchon 's most candid statement concerning the development of corporatism 
as a central aspect of postwar politics does not appear in The Crying of Lot 49 or 
Vineland, but rather in Gravity's Rainbow. Discussing a character named Walter 
Rathenau, a late German foreign minister and wealthy industrialist (in many ways the 
historical precursor of Pierce lnverarity), Pynchon writes: 
He was a philosopher with a vision of the postwar State. He saw the war in 
progress [WW I] as a world revolution, out of which would rise neither Red 
communism nor an unhindered Righ~ but a rational structure in which 
business would be the true, the rightful authority. (165) 
Recognized for his impatience with the dominant Western political paradigm of the 
twentieth century, that "intolerable double vision[ . . . ] Right and Left; the hothouse 
and the street" (Pynchon 1961 469), and for his support of "excluded middles" ( 1966 
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181) (which critics such as Mark Conroy and Jerry Varsava have used as evidence of 
his liberal political inclinations), Pynchon also shows a keen awareness of the 
democratic consequences of liberals, social progressives, and engaged citizens 
vacating the political middle ground of reasonableness and tolerance, in exchange for 
the dangerous corporatist proposition that "if techniques developed by the 
corporations could be brought to bear, might not nations live rationally?" (1973 81) 
The state-sponsored self-interest of Pierce lnverarity and the endemic alienation and 
secrecy that Oedipa discovers in The Crying of Lot 49, combined with Vineland's 
depiction of the decline of labor progressivism and left idealism in postwar America, 
and the co-option of interest group liberalism and the New Deal interventionist state 
by Reagan and the New Right, are strong signals that, for Pynchon, Ratheneau's 
vision of a postwar corporatist state structure is increasingly becoming a reality in 
America. 
Chapter Three 
"The System Had Blessed My Life": Corporatism and the Degradation of Democratic 
Citizenship in White Noise and Underworld 
It would seem that if despotism were to be established among the 
democratic nations of our age, it might assume a different character; it 
would be more extensive and more mild; it would degrade men 
without tormenting them. 
Alexis de Toqueville, Democracy in America 
The future belongs to crowds. 
Don DeLillo, Mao ll 
In an article published in The New Yorker in 1997, Don DeLillo, responding to 
George Will's accusation that his novels constitute "bad citizenship," is quoted as 
saying: 
"I don't take it seriously, but being called a 'bad citizen' is a compliment to a 
novelist, at least in my mind. That's exactly what we ought to do. We ought 
to be bad citizens. We ought to, in the sense that we're writing against what 
power represents, and what the corporation dictates, and what consumer 
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consciousness has come to mean. In that sense, if we're bad citizens, we're 
doing our job." ~emnick 48) 
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In many ways what DeLillo does in his work is depict an America in which good 
citizenship has come to mean acting and thinking in the service of corporations, 
consumer culture, and the assorted organizations and systems which define the 
postmodem world. In both White Noise and Underworld DeLillo explores a 
constellation of themes related to the nature of democratic citizenship in postmodem 
America-ranging from the fragmentation and the weakening of political community 
to the nature of death, the technological, and America's obsession with 
administration. DeLillo's work is by no means a political treatise on the status of 
citizenship in America, but it is quite clear in White Noise and Underworld that he is 
interested in the role that the individual plays in contemporary American society and 
politics. That this interest also brings into focus the influence of corporatism in 
postrnodem America, and its damaging effect on the nature of individual 
participation in contemporary American democracy, is the argument of this chapter. 
Hitler and the Bombbeads 
The primary foremost political figure in White Noise is that most infamous of 
twentieth-century politicians, Adolf Hitler. For most citizens of the post-WW II 
world, Adolf Hitler stands as the very incarnation of evil, a symbol of madness and 
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inhumanity and a figure forever synonymous with genocide, mass murder, and death. 
The mere mention of Hitler, in any context, immediately raises the stakes of 
discourse, including fiction, a fact not lost on Don DeLillo. 
In an article focused on DeLillo's treatment of Hitler in his novels Paul A. 
Cantor writes: 
Clearly DeLillo is fascinated with the phenomenon of Hitler, and presumably 
believes that to understand the twentieth century, we must somehow come to 
terms with Hitler and Nazism. If we want to appreciate DeLillo's 
achievement fully, especially in White Noise, we must accordingly examine 
his portrayal of Hitler. ( 41) 
As Cantor himself points out, if one should choose to follow his advice and endeavor 
to examine DeLillo's portrayal of Hitler as a matter central to a full understanding of 
DeLillo's perspective, one is struck immediately by the distinct lack of direct 
condemnation or moral indignation in his handling of Hitler. Defending DeLillo 
against charges of moral indifference, Cantor points out that Hitler appears in White 
Noise, not as a character, but rather as an academic subject, suggesting that "DeLillo 
may be trying to characterize the contemporary world by showing that such a 
phenomenon as Hitler studies has become possible," and that "in fact, DeLillo could 
find no better example of the flattening-out of contemporary existence than the 
routinization of Hitler's charisma at the College-on-the Hill" ( 40). In fact, Cantor 
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argues, "the whole idea of Hitler studies quickly becomes comic in Delillo's 
portrayal, especially when he links it to the study of another twentieth-century giant, 
Elvis Presley" ( 40). 
The scene to which Cantor is referring is one in which Jack Gladney and his 
academic colleague, Murray Siskind, co-lecture one of Murray's popular culture 
classes, drawing numerous parallels between the lives of Hitler and Elvis for the 
assembled students. Far from being absurd, as Cantor suggests, Delillo's association 
of Hitler and Elvis is disturbing in its appropriateness in terms of contemporary 
American cultural and political values. Hitler and Elvis are both undeniably famous, 
and this celebrity stature, in contemporary America, ensures their value as cultural 
commodities. In White Noise notoriety, whether of the kind associated with Hitler or 
with Elvis, functions as a kind of currency, as a product to be traded on the open 
marketplace of the culture industry in exchange for, amongst other things, 
professional advancement, television ratings, and tuition fees. Hitler and Elvis co-
exist so comfortably in Delillo's America, not because they share similar status, 
cultural relevance, intellectual importance, or political impact, but rather because they 
have been incorporated into the same rational structure, a structure which seems to 
function free of the burdens of moral or intellectual discrimination. 
Significantly, it is Jack's utilization of Hitler within this larger structure that 
provides the model for success in the novel, a fact well understood by Murray: 
You've established a wonderful thing here with Hitler. You [Jack] created it, 
you nurtured it, you made it your own. Nobody on the faculty of any college 
81 
or university in this part of the country can so much as utter the word Hitler 
without a nod in your direction, literally or metaphorically. This is the center, 
the unquestionable source. He is now your Hitler, Gladney's Hitler. It must 
be deeply satisfying for you. The college is internationally known as a result 
of Hitler studies. It bas an identity, a sense of achievement. You've evolved 
an entire system around this figure, a structure with countless substructures 
and interrelated fields of study, a history within history. I marvel at the effort. 
It was masterful, shrewd and stunningly preemptive. It's what I want to do 
with Elvis. (11·12) 
Apparent in this passage is that whatever success or standing Jack garners from his 
study of Hitler is derived not from the quality or discernment of his research but 
rather from his ability to organize and control his subject, that is his ability to manage 
Hitler inside the larger structural concerns of academia and the culture market. 
Jack's role in the system is less that of scholar or researcher than that of administrator 
or manager of Hitler's celebrity. While it is certainly disturbing that DeLillo's 
depiction of postmodem America in White Noise reveals a culture which appears on 
the brink of accepting the kind of moral and intellectual relativism that would have 
Adolf Hitler and Elvis Presley share similar status and standing in a university 
classroom, what is even more disturbing is the suggestion that the impetus for such a 
development is edificial, that is, it is the result of what are essentially structural or 
institutional concerns rather than intellectual or moral ones. 
Academia, in White Noise, resembles nothing more than a marketplace, and it 
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is Jack Gladney's job, and his primary function at the College-on-the Hill, to compete 
in that marketplace as successfully as possible. That the commodity he brings to 
market happens to be Adolf Hitler, the most infamous purveyor of death and terror of 
the twentieth century, seems of little significance or special concern to either Jack or 
the university. In fact Jack has internalized the commercial imperative of corporate 
academia to such an extent that Hitler, as a subject of immense historical, cultural, 
and political significance, loses its moral import and becomes a matter that, for Jack, 
is fundamentally "not a question of good and evil" (63). Jack reduces Hitler to a 
mere structural tool, a means for career advancement and the accumulation of power 
within the administrative system that dominates the university. Despite teaching a 
course which claims to "cultivate historical perspective, theoretical rigor and mature 
insight into the continuing mass appeal of fascist tyranny" (25), Jack manages to 
completely lose touch with any larger understanding of Hitler, the danger of his ideas, 
and the historical dilemmas which do indeed make Hitler a question of good and evil 
for any democratic civilization. 
America, for DeLillo, is quickly becoming a country of specialists and 
technocrats, individuals for whom knowledge exists as nothing more than currency, 
and for whom privilege and influence are sought through the accumulation of ever 
more specialized knowledge and expertise to be controlled, organized, and 
administered in the service of corporatist structures and systems of power. Jack is 
able to shape a successful academic career based on the study of Hitler, despite being 
unable to speak German, because he is a shrewd technocrat. He understands that 
success, in the contemporary academic environment, is more a matter of structural 
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and administrative resourcefulness than authentic scholarship or academic work. 
In Underworld DeLillo's evocation of the American military-industrial 
complex raises many of the same issues as his depiction of academia in White Noise. 
Matt Shay, a talented scientist, is involved in a secret weapons research operation 
called "the Pocket," an endeavor that his brother Nick describes as "government work 
that involved classified projects and remote locations" (199). Matt and his fellow 
scientists and researchers undertake their work without knowledge of its full 
consequences or implications. They simply fulfill their systemic role, working in 
their small area of expertise in the service of the secretive larger structure. 
There were people here who weren't sure whether they were doing weapons 
work. They were involved in exploratory research and didn't know exactly 
what happened to their findings, their simulations, the results they discovered 
or predicted. This is one of the underlying themes of the systems business, 
where all the work connects at levels and geographic points far removed from 
the desk toil and lab projects of the researchers. ( 401) 
Like Jack, who eventually loses sight of the moral entailments of his work, the most 
successful scientists of '"the Pocket" are the ones who are best able to distance 
themselves from the implications of their research, and focus on the technical details 
of the project and the functional demands of the system. Matt calls these scientific 
technocrats "bombheads" and he describes them in the following manner: 
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The bombheads loved their work but weren't necessarily pro-bomb[ ... ]. 
They were the people of superior sensibility, the ones who'd gained a rational 
mastery over themselves, who were not subject to moral ambivalence, to the 
sentimental babyshit of consequence and anguish. They were the ones who 
understood the hard-ass principles of the conflict. ( 404-405) 
.. Bombheads" represent the corporatist ideal. Men and woman of reason who are 
completely given over to the logic of the system, "bombheads" manage the creation 
and dissemination of information within a large system of power, in this case the 
military-industrial complex, unconcerned with the larger political, social or moral 
implications of their actions. 
In White Noise and Underworld large structures of power, be they state, 
military, corporate or cultural, consume individualism. It is part of their structural 
imperative to impose a singular vision, a corporatist ethos that emphasizes the 
subordination of one's individual and moral identity to one's professional or systemic 
role. In this regard the preeminent organizational structure confronting the 
individual in contemporary America, and the one which, for DeLillo, functions as the 
model for postmodem political, social, and cultural structures of all kinds, is the 
corporation. Through Nick Shay, the central character of Underworld, DeLillo offers 
this description ofthe danger that the increasing ubiquity of the corporate structure 
poses to the individual: 
Corporations are great and appalling things. They take you and shape you in 
nearly nothing flat, twist and swivel you. And they do it without overt 
persuasion, they do it with smiles and nods, a collective inflection of voice. 
You stand at the head of a corridor and by the time you walk to the far end 
you have adopted the comprehensive philosophy of the firm, the 
Weltanschauung. (282) 
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Corporate structures, for DeLillo, are fundamentally undemocratic. They reward 
conformity, are systemically indisposed to plurality, and discourage the existence of 
individual perspectives and alternative ideas. 
Delillo's equation here is simple: as more and more of the systems and 
structures that define postmodem American life become corporatized, as the academy 
adopts the structural values of the capitalist marketplace and the methodology of 
industry and the state grow indistinguishable, the role of the individual in America 
becomes increasingly degraded. DeLillo's recognition of the threat that the growing 
corporatization of America poses is demonstrated in the following passage from 
Underworld, in which a young radical draws attention to the systemic nature of 
power in contemporary America: 
We can look around us ... and see the business executives, the fashion 
photographers, the government officials, the industrialists, the writers, the 
bankers, the academics, the pig-faced aristocrats in exile, and we can know 
the soul of one by the bitter wrinkled body of the other and then know all by 
the soul of the one. Because they're all part of the same motherfucking thing . 
.. The state, the nation, the corporation, the power structure, the system, the 
establishment. (575) 
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The exercise of power, in a corporatist society, is focused around the refinement and 
control of complex structures. Individuals operate within these structures as 
managers, experts and consumers, but ultimately corporatist systems function in their 
own interests, and in a manner that disregards any notion of the public good and 
makes the contribution of the individual citizen increasingly irrelevant. Why the 
postmodem individual, as depicted by DeLillo in White Noise and Underworld, is 
especially vulnerable to this corporatist obsession with organization and structure, to 
the great detriment of the role of democratic citizen in contemporary America, is the 
principal subject of the next section. 
Community, Immortality and the System 
At some point while reading White Noise and Underworld one begins to 
understand that, beyond the clever social and cultural commentary, beyond the cogent 
depiction of contemporary family mores, mass media, and the vagaries of postmodem 
America lies DeLillo's central preoccupation-"Let me whisper the terrible word, 
from the Old English, from the Old German, from the Old Norse. Death" (DeLillo 
1984 73 ). Indeed, death is more a shout than a whisper from Don DeLillo in White 
Noise and Underworld. In many ways it defines not only his central theme but also 
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his perspective, the angle from which he approaches the many facets of America's 
postmodem landscape which are explored in the two novels. DeLillo understands 
death, not just as an essential element of the human condition, though most certainly 
that, but also as an inescapable social, cultural, and political fact. 
Death is an issue which may not appear in election campaign advertisements 
or provoke memorable sound-bites during presidential election debates, yet in all of 
its uncertainty, fearsomeness, and existential angst, death is as central to postmodem 
American politics as it was to the politics of ancient Rome, medieval Britain or 
Napoleonic France. Despite remarkable advances in medical technology, 
considerable increases in average life expectancy, and imponant political 
developments which provide substantial protections for individual citizens against 
arbitrary state power, the political importance of death endures and, as Michael J. 
Shapiro puts it, "death remains effectively if not officially on the policy agenda" 
(125). White Noise and Underworld constitute, in many respects, DeLillo's 
exploration of the current state of death in America-how it is constructed culturally, 
how America's postmodem society deals with the anxiety it creates, and, most 
importantly for our purposes, how death figures in the contemporary American 
political scene, in particular how it functions as an ideological tool in the service of 
those political forces in America we are calling corporatist. 
Issues relating to death, and the fear of death, intersect with our concerns 
about corporatism around two central themes of DeLillo's work-technology and the 
system. Our attentions, being mainly political, will focus on the manner in which 
contemporary America's obsessions with technology and systems help to create what 
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John Ralston Saul calls a "politics of immortality," or a democratically unhealthy 
belief in the eternalness of instrumental systems and structures. This kind of politics, 
which speaks to the very human desire for immortality, leaves a democratic polis 
directionless and dependent on systems and on those who control systems for a sense 
of community, a political environment which serves only to entrench further 
corporatist practices and values. 
Ours is undoubtedly an age obsessed with technology, and it is technology 
that is the focal point of Delillo's unravelling of the cultural logic of death and 
immortality in White Noise and Underworld. For DeLillo technology has replaced 
religion and metaphysics as the faith of choice when it comes to confronting the 
reality of mortality for the postmodem individual, as Murray Siskind articulates in 
White Noise when he councils Jack concerning the best way to deal with his fear of 
dying: 
You could put your faith in technology. It got you here, it can get you out. 
This is the whole point of technology. It creates an appetite for immortality 
on the one hand. It threatens universal extinction on the other[ ... ]. It's what 
we invented to conceal the terrible secret of our decaying bodies. But it's also 
life, isn't it? It prolongs life, it provides new organs for those that wear out. 
New devices, new techniques every day. Lasers, masers, ultrasound. Give 
yourself up to it, Jack. Believe in it. (285) 
True to his character's words, technology in While Noise and Underworld is 
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portrayed as both the agent of unnatural death and the harbinger of death deferred, of 
immortality. DeLillo unmistakably illustrates the paradoxical nature of modem 
technology in White Noise through the co-existence of the two major technological 
phenomena in the novel-"Tbe Airborne Toxic Event" and Dylar. 
Though certainly "The Airborne Toxic Event" does not finally cause Jack's 
death, and Dylar turns out not to be the "cure" for her fear of death that Babette 
hoped for, both are trenchant symbols of what DeLillo believes is most dangerous 
about postmodern America's obsession with technology. "The Airborne Toxic 
Event," like the atomic bomb in Underworld, is the kind of development that 
alienates the individual from the existentially rich experience of his or her own 
mortality. With the threat of death so intimately linked to technology in the 
contemporary world--or as DeLillo succinctly states it in Underworld "all 
technology refers to the bomb" (467)-the postmodem individual is encouraged to 
view death as the professional concern of those who control and manage 
technology-scientists and technocrats. There is a sense in DeLillo's work, as Jack 
in White Noise puts it, that technology "makes you feel like a stranger in your own 
dying," that our obsession with technology is stripping us of an essential connection 
with our own mortality (142). 
This technological alienation is, however, counterbalanced by the modem 
faith in technology, the sense that it represents unbounded possibilities. Faced with 
his own mortality, Jack responds to Murray's question concerning whether be feels 
his suspected impending demise would be premature, with the following: 
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Every death is premature. There's no scientific reason why we can't live a 
hundred and fifty years. Some people actually do it, according to a headline I 
saw at the supermarket. (283) 
For Jack, modem science represents the promise of immortality and technology the 
capacity to transcend death. As Michael Valdez Moses argues, Jack's attitude 
towards death is the result ofpostmodemism's "technological understanding of the 
world, what Heidegger calls the 'essence' of technology" (67). As Moses explains: 
For DeLillo as for Heidegger the danger of technology is greater on the 
metaphysical level than on the physical level. At the very least, Jack and his 
family can see the airborne toxic event and can recognize in it a potential 
threat to their physical existence. But the most sinister and insidious aspect of 
modem technology is its more or less undetectable effect on the psyche. (71) 
In effect technology threatens to alienate the individual from his/her own existence, 
from the possibility of experiencing life and death authentically rather than as 
"simulacra" (to use Baudrillard's term), as an "illusion" (to use Heidegger's term), or 
as "artificial" (to use Jack's term). It entices the individual into thinking that 
technology can provide a solution to every problem, an answer to every question and 
a balm for every pain, and uses as its chief lure the promise of the ultimate solution to 
the individual's ultimate anxiety-it promises immortality. 
Certainly it is true that in White Noise Dylar is a drug that does not promise an 
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individual that he/she will live forever, rather only that it can eliminate an 
individual's fear of death; that is, it can simulate immortality. Of course DeLillo's 
point has nothing to do with whether or not technology can actually deliver 
immortality, but rather that it is its promise that is so alluring for the individual. The 
significance of Dylar, as a particularly postmodem response to the anxiety of death, 
lies not in the notion of the technology itself, that is in the idea of a pill that relieves 
an individual from his/her fear of death, but rather in the methodology it represents, a 
methodology, as Moses indicates, that is quintessentially corporatist: 
The technocratic and behaviorist approach of Grey Research, the firm in 
White Noise that manufactures Dylar, follows the instrumental reasoning of a 
purely representational conception of the world; manipulate the signs, 
deconstruct the symptoms and the cause or referent in effect disappears. (76) 
If one believes Jean Baudrillard's contention that postmodem America is a utopia of 
signs, a culture without referents and a people that .. believe in facts, but not facticity" 
(85), then it is easy to understand how an ideology like corporatism could flourish. 
As the "technological understanding of the world" increasingly dominates 
contemporary American culture, and the line between simulation and reality becomes 
an increasingly blurry one for the individual American psyche, corporate structures 
have adapted their technocratic methodologies to exploit the power of simulation for 
their own interests, as DeLillo points out in this passage from Underworld, in which 
he describes the corporate manipulation of the democratic process: 
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In the bronze tower we used the rhetoric of aggrieved minorities to prevent 
legislation that would hurt our business. Arthur Blessing believed, our CEO, 
that true feeling flows upward from the streets, fully accessible to corporate 
adaptation. We learned how to complain, how to appropriate the language of 
victimization. ( 119) 
Corporatist organizations have become experts at appropriating the signs and 
language of democracy, while simultaneously betraying the fundamental values and 
ideals on which it is based, and in fact often go so far as to represent themselves as its 
defenders and protectors. 
Early on in White Noise, during a conversation with his wife Babette, Jack 
rather flippantly remarks that in contemporary America "maybe there is no death as 
we know it. Just documents changing hands" (6). What this comment suggests, that 
postmodem America has become so administration obsessed that even death can be 
conceived of as nothing more than a mere bureaucratic process, is indicative of a 
perception that Delillo carefully cultivates in his work, that in contemporary 
America death is organized and managed in the service of a larger structure, a system 
which has taken the place of existential or theological understandings of mortality. In 
the same way that Dylar offers a chemically induced respite for the individual from 
the anxiety associated with death, corporatism and its obsession with administration 
and systems tap into the individual fear of mortality by offering a technocratic fantasy 
of immortality, a world where the possibility of eternity is built into the universal 
methodology of instrumental reason. Discussing this aspect of corporatism, John 
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Ralston Saul writes: 
We have, in effect, replaced beliefs with systems, and this bas created a new 
kind of calming device which proposes eternity on earth. The web of Western 
rational society offers the individual a ftxed place as an expert in a self-
fulfilling and apparently eternal structure. The very lack of clarity, the lack of 
clear goals and conclusions, the very ease with which the structure weaves 
endlessly about us is what makes it resemble the eternal bed of nirvana. 
( 1992 348) 
The individual, under corporatist influence, exchanges the power inherent in the idea 
of democratic citizenship, that is, the power to contribute to the direction and form of 
society, for the sense of comfort and reassurance that accompanies the corporatist 
promise of eternal structural stability. 
Fixed in his or her position within the system, the individual naturally comes 
to the conclusion that understanding, clarity of purpose, and a sense of public 
responsibility are less important than focusing on whatever area of expertise defines 
one's instrumental usefulness. Corporatist structures offer a sense of belonging for 
the individual, but it is a sense of belonging that contradicts the very principles of 
participatory democracy. Jack describes his experience of this corporatist sense of 
belonging in the following passage from White Noise: 
In the morning I walked to the bank. I went to that automated teller machine 
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to check my balance. I inserted my card, entered my secret code, tapped out 
my request. The figure on the screen roughly corresponded to my 
independent estimate, feebly arrived at after long searches through 
documents, tonnented arithmetic. Waves of relief and gratitude flowed over 
me. The system had blessed my life. I felt its support and approval[ ... ]. I 
sensed that something of deep personal value, but not money, not at all, had 
been authenticated and confinned. ( 46) 
The system from which Jack receives such a strong sense of support and well-being is 
both distant and invisible, a structure that is beyond either his understanding or 
control. He is overwhelmed by its efficiency and impressed with its intricateness and 
size. It demands nothing more from him but that he witness its functioning and 
accept its blessing; it makes him a passive recipient rather than an active participant 
in its exercise of power. But most of all Jack finds in the system the promise of 
eternity, the reassurance that his life and society are being given fonn and shape by 
forces which function beyond the limits imposed by mortality. 
In Underworld both Matt Shay and Sister Edgar are disturbed by the 
implications of America's growing faith in technology and especially the passivity of 
their roles in "the all-knowing systems that shape them" (251 ). Matt who had 
originally set out to do weapons work because "he'd wanted the edge, the identity, 
the sense of honing his silhouette, knowing himself a little better" ( 402), soon 
discovers that "the Pocket" is certainly no place for individualism or self-knowledge. 
Assigned a role in a project whose goals and dimensions, beyond the general 
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knowledge that he "was definitely doing weapons work., ( 402), are kept secret from 
him, Matt is unable to fully divorce his sense of personal responsibility and moral 
conscience from his work. Unlike Jack Gladney, Matt finds no comfort in the grand 
promise of the system, the knowledge that "Everything connected at some 
undisclosed point down the systems line" ( 408). 
Matt is haunted by "doubts about the rightness of his role" (404), and, in the 
kind of visionary moment that Paul Maltby finds characteristic of DeLillo's work, 
Matt experiences a drug-induced epiphany concerning the shape of power in 
contemporary America-
He was surrounded by enemies. Not enemies but connections, a network of 
things and people. Not people exactly but figures-things and figures and 
levels of knowledge that he was completely helpless to enter[ ... ]. He was 
bent to the weight of the room, distrustful of everyone and everything here. 
Paranoid. Now he knew what it meant, this word that was bandied and 
bruited so easily, and he sensed the connections being made around him, all 
the objects and shaped silhouettes and levels of knowledge-not knowledge 
exactly but insidious intent. But not that either-some deeper meaning that 
existed solely to keep him from knowing what it was. ( 421) 
The next day, sober and "thinking about his paranoid episode at the bombhead party 
the night before," Matt contemplates the significance of his vision: 
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He felt he'd glimpsed some horrific system of connections in which you can't 
tell the difference between one thing and another, between a soup can and a 
car bomb, because they are made by the same people in the same way and 
ultimately refer to the same thing. ( 446) 
Death, for Matt, like any other commodity in contemporary America, is produced 
within a system that demands mass uniformity, and which flattens any nuance or 
individualism in the interests of capital and the marketplace. "And how can you tell 
the difference between orange juice and agent orange if the same massive system 
connects them at levels outside your comprehension" ( 465)? This central question 
posed by Matt in Underworld mirrors the failure of Jack to really understand the 
difference between Hitler and Elvis in White Noise. For DeLillo, it is indicative of 
the precarious situation of the individual in contemporary America that weapons of 
mass destruction (death) and basic consumer items (prosperity) are systemically 
connected, that is, they are produced and managed by the same corporate structure in 
the interests of the same marketplace system. 
America has, as Murray counsels in White Noise, put its faith in technology. 
Sister Edgar, in Underworld, goes so far as to suggest that the power of modem 
science, to both destroy and prolong life, has produced in America a "faith that 
replaces God with radioactivity, the power of alpha particles and the all-knowing 
systems that shape them" (251). Technology in the contemporary world holds both 
the promise of immortality and the potential of obli~ion for the individual, and thus 
the individual is confronted with the immense power of those systems and structures 
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which manage and control technology-the state, corporations, the military, 
universities-all of which are connected in extraordinarily complicated ways. The 
power and pervasiveness of these systems are overwhelming for the individual, and, 
as Sister Edgar realizes by the end of Underworld, ultimately bring about the 
degradation of the role of individuals in determining the shape and direction of 
society-"the intersecting systems help pull us apart, leaving us vague, drained, 
docile, soft in our inner discourse, willing to be shaped" (826). 
The psychological and social influence of the promise of, and desire for, 
immortality in postmodem America, may have its roots in America's obsession with 
technology, but it is a drama that ultimately plays itself out on the American political 
stage. The politics of any country is first and foremost a human endeavor and thus is 
subject to the influence of what is the most essential of human concerns-the fear of 
death. The great lesson of Hitler for American democracy, and the key to 
understanding the nature of Hitler's significance in White Noise, is that while 
culturally Hitler does and always should represent mass murder and death, politically 
it is essential that he be understood as representative of the dangers inherent in "the 
politics of immortality," or the effective use of fear of death on the public stage. 
DeLillo's critique ofpostmodem America in White Noise includes the presence of 
Hitler for just this reason, for Hitler is the latest and most famous example of a leader 
who effectively manipulated the great desire for immortality in his country's people 
for his own political advantage. 
Jack's own course on "Advanced Nazism" endeavors to explore the relevance 
of Hitler to contemporary politics, but significantly it is not Jack who fmally offers an 
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explanation for "the continuing mass appeal of fascist tyranny" in America. Focusing 
on the plight of the individual psyche rather than on ideology, it is Murray who offers 
his understanding of the appeal of Hitler while discussing death with Jack. 
"Helpless and fearful people are drawn to magical figures, mythic 
figures, epic men who intimidate and darkly loom." 
"You're talking about Hitler, I take it." 
"Some people are larger than life. Hitler is larger than death. You 
thought he would protect you[ . . . ]. You wanted to be helped and sheltered. 
The overwhelming horror would leave no room for your own death. 
'Submerge me,' you said. • Absorb my fear.' (287) 
Paul A. Cantor rightly argues that this passage shows that "Delillo understands the 
psychological appeal of totalitarianism" (48), and John N. Duvall goes so far as to 
suggest that •• White Noise posits fear of death as the ground of fascism" ( 450-451 ), 
but this passage also serves to demonstrate that the focus of Hitler's presence in 
White Noise is less concerned with revealing the appeal of ideological totalitarianism 
than it is with identifying the continuing political relevance of the desire for 
immortality in contemporary American politics and society. What one recognizes in 
DeLillo's portrayal of Jack's fascination with Hitler is the implication that, while 
certainly Hitler's ideas and ideology are more or less banished from the 
contemporary American political scene, Hitler's methods and heroic political style 
are still both pervasive and effective in postmodem democratic politics. 
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The illusion of immortality, a political tool of which Hitler was a master, is so 
common a fixture of contemporary political theatre that we have come to accept it as 
a model of leadership. In White Noise. at the height of the crisis surrounding the 
"airborne toxic event," when those in the exposed area, including Jack, are feeling 
most vulnerable and afraid, Jack cynically awaits the arrival of the state governor-
It was said that the governor was on his way from the capitol in an executive 
helicopter. It would probably set down in a bean field outside a deserted 
town, allowing the governor to emerge, square-jawed and confident, in bush 
jacket, within camera range, for ten or fifteen seconds, as a demonstration of 
his imperishability. ( 130) 
Like Jack, we have come to expect our leaders to play the hero, however false and 
illusory that dramaturgy might be, because leadership, in a corporatist society, is a 
matter of methodology and image rather than substance and reality. Leaders are 
merely expected to reflect the values and characteristics of the structures they 
manage-that is, we expect them to offer the same reassurance of the eternal that we 
feel in our dependence on rational structures for our sense of belonging and 
community. Imagining the mock-heroic spectacle of the governor "cheating death" 
for the TV cameras has the same effect on Jack as watching the evacuation of the 
local asylum-"lt seemed to mean the structure was intact" (128). 
As long as the system continues to function in something like a reasonable 
manner, Jack seems unconcerned about the nature of its leadership or the identity of 
100 
those who exercise power within it. Trying to reassure his son that the "airborne 
toxic event" crisis was being duly managed by some kind of authority, Jack confronts 
how little he actually knows about the nature of those who have power in postmodem 
America: 
"They seem to have things under control," I said. 
''Who?" 
"Whoever's in charge out there." 
"Who's in charge?" 
"Never mind." ( 147) 
The system has become so complicated that a simple question-"Who's in 
charge?"-a question whose answer is the very measure of the democratic health of a 
society, is impossible to answer for Jack. 
Jack's son Heinrich seems to understand that Jack's response of"never mind" 
is indicative of a larger condition-a sense that the postmodem individual inhabits a 
world that, despite the prolific and unyielding production of data and knowledge, is 
beyond his/her understanding. Heinrich challenges Jack with the notion that the 
pervasive acceptance of complication, confusion, and unintelligibility as a natural 
part of modern social existence is indicative of the diminished status of the individual 
in contemporary America. "What good is knowledge," Heinrich asks Jack, summing 
up his argument that the modem individual knows precious little more than the 
ancient Greeks, .. if it just floats in the air? It goes from computer to computer. It 
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changes and grows every second of every day. But nobody actually knows anything" 
( 148-49). If it is true, as Jack is informed by SIMUV AC, that as an individual in 
America "you are the sum total of your data," then it is Heinrich's point that the lack 
of control and understanding of data and information on the part of the contemporary 
individual is as defining a characteristic ofpostmodem America as its technological 
advancements ( 141 ). 
It is Neil Postman's contention that the inability to process and control the 
glut of information which surrounds the individual in our technology-obsessed 
culture constitutes the development of a new kind of social order, a social order 
which robs the individual of his/her social perspective. Postman writes: 
The relationship between information and the mechanisms for its control is 
fairly simple to describe: Technology increases the available supply of 
information. As the supply is increased, control mechanisms are strained. 
Additional control mechanisms are needed to cope with new information. 
When additional control mechanisms are themselves technical, they in tum 
further increase the supply of information. When the supply of information is 
no longer controllable a general breakdown of psychic tranquility and social 
purpose occurs. (72) 
In a democracy such a condition is undesirable. When it becomes virtually 
impossible for individual citizens to understand bow their society is directed, that is, 
how power is exercised, the sense of democratic empowerment and purpose within a 
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polity is eroded, and citizens are made almost completely dependent on those who 
either better understand the technology which generates information, or on groups 
and organizations which have influence on the systems and structures which control 
information and for which it functions as a currency of power. 
As these corporatist groups and organizations increasingly come to dominate 
the democratic process, citizens begin to feel isolated and increasingly distant from 
that process. They begin to sense that their participation in the process bas little or no 
real effect on public policy and the shape of their nation. No longer able to identify 
with a civitas, with the larger political community, individuals increasingly tum to 
organized interests to represent them, while they tum their attention away from their 
democratic roles as citizens and instead focus their energies on their systemic roles as 
consumers and managers. Charles Taylor calls this political condition 
"fragmentation," and explains the damaging effect that it has on contemporary 
democratic practice in a passage in The Malaise of Modernity: 
The danger is not actual despotic control but fragmentation-that is, a people 
increasingly less capable of forming a common purpose and carrying it out. 
Fragmentation arises when people come to see themselves more and more 
atomistically, otherwise put, as less and less bound to their fellow citizens in 
common projects and allegiances. They may indeed feel linked in common 
projects with some others, but these come more to be partial groupings rather 
than the whole society: for instance, a local community, an ethnic minority, 
the adherents of some religion or ideology, the promoters of some special 
interest. (112 -13) 
For Matt Shay in Underworld, "the Pocket" functions as just the kind of"partial 
grouping" which supplants "the whole society" that Taylor describes: 
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The Pocket was one of those nice tight societies that replaces the world. It 
was the world made personal and consistently interesting because it was what 
you did, and others like you, and it was self-enclosed and self-referring and 
you did it all together in a place and a language that were inaccessible to 
others. (DeLillo 412) 
However, Matt soon comes to recognize that ''The Pocket was just a cozy donut-dunk 
in a vast hidden system," a corporatist system which constitutes an antagonistic 
presence for a democracy which depends on the participation and contribution of 
individual citizens, not their fonnation into functional groups and organizational 
interests, for its authority and vitality. 
Corporatism, at its heart, is just this kind of weakening of democratic purpose 
amongst a citizenry. Jean Bethke Elshtain points out that as the drive towards 
democratic initiative slips away and individual citizens find it more and more 
difficult to identify with their democratic polity as a political community, that is in 
the absence of a strong and functional sense of democratic public responsibility and 
empowerment, "we are thrown back on ourselves in the ever-raging currents of 
consumer excess, or the cold comfort of ever more computerized and centralized 
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bureaucracies" (23). To put this another way, one of the inevitable consequences of 
an increasingly corporatist political culture is a loss of democratic identity, or sense 
of political citizenship, on the part of the individual, a void which, in contemporary 
Americ.1, is too easily filled by the superficial individualism of consumer culture and 
the fragmenting identity politics of organized interest groups and the corporate co-
option of the American political agenda. 
DeLillo's work shows a strong interest in the crisis surrounding definitions of 
political community and democratic citizenship in postmodem American, a concern 
he makes apparent early in White Noise with the following description of the parade 
of station wagons which accompanies the start of the new school year at the 
university where Jack teaches: 
The students greet each other with comic cries and gestures of sodden 
collapse. Their summer bas been bloated with criminal pleasures, as always. 
The parents stand sun-dazed near their automobiles, seeing images of 
themselves in every direction. The conscientious suntans. The well made 
faces and wry looks. They feel a sense of renewal, of communal recognition. 
The woman crisp and alert, in diet trim, knowing people's names. Their 
husbands content to measure out the time, distant but ungrudging, 
accomplished in parenthood, something about them suggesting massive 
insurance coverage. This assembly of station wagons, as much as anything 
else they might do in the course of the year, more than fonnal liturgies or 
laws, tells the parent they are a collection of the like-minded and the 
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spiritually akin, a people, a nation. (3-4) 
What seems to connect these people, Jack observes, what defines their nationhood for 
them, is their prosperity, their sense of satisfaction in their shared material lifestyle. 
In this passage DeLillo suggests that within the mass conformist culture that 
characterizes postmodem America in his work, community is largely defined by a 
sense of shared exuberance in the postmodem deluge of signs and commodities 
which constitute the surface of contemporary America's consumerist way of life. 
Individualism in such a society, as DeLillo puts in Underworld, is swept away by 
"the convergence of consumer desire--not that people want the same things, 
necessarily, but that they want the same range of choices" (785). For DeLillo, 
consumerism manages cultural and social possibilities by incorporating individual 
expression and desire into a system which "burns off the nuance in a culture [ ... ] 
making for a certain furtive sameness, a planing away of particulars that affects 
everything from architecture to leisure time to the way people eat and sleep and 
dream" (785-86). Politically, corporatism does much the same thing, preserving the 
appearance of individual choice while systemically ensuring that all political 
possibilities serve the interests of the larger structure. 
In White Noise Jack tells his students that ''to become a crowd is to keep out 
death. To break off from the crowd is to risk death as an individual, to face dying 
alone" (73). Jack, as a man longing to release himself from the fears and burdens of 
his own individualism, is drawn to the powerful images of glorious and eternal 
nationhood ("parades, rallies and uniforms" [25]) that were so central to Hitler's 
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political style, because they represent the convergence of community and 
immortality, the sense that he is part of something larger, something eternal, and thus 
shielded from both death and loneliness. As an individual he is both lost and 
preserved in a crowd; he is able to transcend his personal anxieties and 
responsibilities by being subsumed within a larger, more powerful entity, an entity 
which imbues him with a magnitude and sense of belonging not available to him as 
an individual citizen. In Underworld the corporation poses the same dilemma, 
articulated in the novel by Nick's friend and corporate colleague Brian-"Disappear 
in the company and die. Only I don't do it to disappear. I do it to be visible and 
audible" (256). The price to be paid in both cases is the forfeiture of one's autonomy, 
self-consciousness, and self-determination. 
Corporatism, of course, is the political and social manifestation of Jack's and 
Brian's capitulation writ large. The crowd, the system, the corporation, the 
professional guild, all of the corporatist entities that DeLillo depicts in his work, 
present the same challenge to America's image of itself as a democracy. To repeat 
John Ralston Saul's words, "We have, in effect, replaced beliefs with systems," and 
in doing so have done great damage to the role that the individual citizen must play in 
deciding the direction of American politics, culture, and society if the nation is to 
resist the forces of corporatism and continue to legitimately call itself democratic . 
• 
It would certainly be overstating the case to suggest that White Noise and Underworld 
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are Don DeLillo's attempt at a rigorous theorization or systematic analysis of 
contemporary American corporatism. The specifics of interest group politics and the 
democratic legitimacy of functional associational pluralism are, at best, matters of 
marginal concern in DeLillo's work. However, what is of central concern to DeLillo 
is the damage that postmodem culture and society have done to the individual psyche. 
Consumerism, the relationship between death and technology, the changing nature of 
postmodern community, and the growing pervasiveness of corporate structures and 
marketplace systems in contemporary culture and politics are some of the issues 
which converge in DeLillo's examination of the nature ofpostmodem individualism 
and the role of the individual in contemporary America. Such subject matter is 
unavoidably political, especially when one considers that DeLillo's novel is set in a 
society which purports to be democratic, that is, a society that is supposed to define 
and direct itself based on the participation and contribution of its individual citizens. 
Put simply, my aim in this chapter bas been to suggest that the constellation of 
themes which DeLillo outlines to express his perspective concerning the degradation 
of the individual in postmodem America, points inescapably to the growing 
influence, in contemporary America, of an ideology that is anti-individual and anti-
democratic. It is my argument that the best, most useful term to describe this 
ideology is corporatism. 
Conclusion 
Certainly the period of American history which frames my discussion here, 
from the end of WW II (Mailer's The Naked and the Dead was published in 1948) to 
the brink of the end of the twentieth century (DeLillo's Underworld was published in 
1997) is a significant, varied, and complicated era. It is a period in which America 
has achieved unprecedented levels of prosperity, and unparalleled influence on the 
international political stage. It is also a period in which American democracy has 
faced significant challenges and undergone remarkable transformations. From the 
civil rights movement and the increased political participation of woman, to the 
increasing power of television in the political process, democracy in America is not 
the same as it was before 1945. That much, I would venture, is indisputable. 
Today America is confronted with many challenges to the integrity and 
vitality of its democracy. As even a cursory glance at a current newspaper or 
political magazine will indicate, corporatism is an unavoidable aspect of the 
contemporary American political environment. While such issues as corporate 
welfare, the ever-expanding influence of Washington lobbyists, and an American 
foreign policy increasingly dominated by the narrow interests of the corporate agenda 
point unavoidably in a corporatist direction, no issue speaks to the dangers of 
corporatism to American democracy as directly as the current system of fmancing 
elections. Discussing the most recent presidential election of 1996 in a 1998 article 
in Atlantic Monthly, U.S. Senator Joseph Lieberman writes: 
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The fundraising scandal of 1996 was a very real tragedy, with very real 
consequences for our democracy. People at the highest levels in both political 
parties did more than just strain credulity: they betrayed the public trust. In 
their breathless, unbounded rush to raise even more money for even more 
television advertising, they effectively hung a giant FOR SALE sign on our 
government and the whole of our political process. They also gave 
Americans, already beset by cynicism, good reason to doubt whether citizens 
have a true and equal voice in their own government. ( 1 5-16) 
As Senator Lieberman's words indicate, corporatism in contemporary America is 
more than just an abstract political theory or ideological concept. Rather corporatism 
is a very relevant and immediate political presence with real consequences for 
American democracy. 
To witness and to theorize American democracy in the second half of the 
twentieth century is, of course, the province of historians, political scientists, 
journalists, and intellectuals. Yet, historically, the state and health of American 
democracy have also been a great concern of the American writer, in particular the 
American novelist. Following in the great tradition of Whitman, Emerson, Melville, 
Irving, Twain, Adams, Dos Passos, Steinbeck and Sinclair, the so-called 
"postmodemist" novelists Mailer, DeLillo, and Pyncbon, or so I have argued, show a 
marked attention to issues surrounding the vitality of democracy in America. 
That I have chosen to focus on one particular issue, the issue of corporatism, 
is no indication of a narrow range of political concern in the works that I have 
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discussed. Certainly the breath and scope of political observation and comment in 
the novels of Mailer, Pynchon, and DeLillo stretch well beyond the specific concerns 
of this thesis. However, as I stated in the introduction, it is not my intention to brand 
any of these writers as single issue novelists or anti-corporatist advocates; rather, I 
simply set out to confirm that corporatism is a useful political reference to have 
available when approaching the constellation of themes that appear in the literature 
discussed. The fundamental argument on which this thesis rests, that corporatism is a 
shared political and thematic concern of three major American postwar novelists, 
ultimately demonstrates that corporatism is insufficiently noted by critics of this 
literature to the significant detriment of a full understanding of the work of each 
respective writer, and at the cost of firmly grasping the full range of political 
concerns represented in the postmodem American novel. 
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